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HOOTING: PUBLIC AND POPULAR DISCOURSE
ABOUT SEX DISCRIMINATIONt
Kenneth L. Schneyer*
In this Article, Professor Schneyer focuses on the debate surrounding
the Hooters restaurant chain. He argues that the debate surrounding
Hooters inevitably addresses the nature and importance of gender
and sexuality in culture and business. Professor Schneyer uses the
lens of constitutive rhetoric to analyze several texts created by both
sides during this debate. He concludes that varying participants in
the debate use rhetoric for different purposes. Some, like commentator
Laura Archer Pulfer, use rhetoric that encourages growth and critical
analysis, while others, like Hooters itself, use rhetoric to encourage
unquestioning belief Overall, Professor Schneyer observes that Hoot-
ers's supporters use their rhetoric to proffer the view that the
intellectual and political elites are at war with 'common sense" and
the ordinary American. In a debate this complex, however, rhetoric of
this sort is not helpful in resolving the underlying issue of the propriety
of sexual entertainment in a society that condemns sex discrimination.
To address this issue, Professor Schneyer argues that we need a nu-
anced debate that encourages critical and independent analysis of
the complexities involved, not a debate hemmed in by simplistic
metaphors and thought-stifling rhetoric
In recent years there have been a surprising number of legal
attacks on the restaurant chain named Hooters. These attacks
have all been based, one way or another, on claims of sex dis-
crimination in employment. Yet the attacks vary considerably:
some are based on claims of sexual harassment, some on
claims by private individuals that they have been discrimi-
nated against in hiring because they are male, still others on
general claims that the chain is engaged in systemic sex dis-
crimination. Many of these claims are concerned with the
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troubling boundaries of the bona fide occupational qualification,
that uncomfortable defense to claims of overt discrimination.
That a single business enterprise should be the target of so
many different kinds of sex discrimination claims is curious.
These claims have inspired a broad, loud, public debate.
Spurred by the public relations efforts of the Hooters chain
itself, hundreds of editorials have been written; legal scholars
have ventured their opinions; and ordinary people can discuss
the topic reasonably well. This dissonant chorus of voices is
struggling to create a public consciousness about the Hooters
controversies, a consciousness that cannot avoid addressing
the nature and importance of gender and sexuality in culture
and business. It is trying to reconstitute the world.
In this Article, I use the tools of constitutive rhetoric to ex-
amine the texts created by several different kinds of voices
speaking about this subject. My aim is to assess and criticize
the kind of worlds being remade by these texts. In Part I, I re-
view the relevant principles of sex discrimination law as they
apply to employment. In Part II, I explain and justify the tools
of constitutive rhetoric. In Part III, I recount the history of the
Hooters restaurant chain and its legal difficulties involving
sex discrimination. In Part IV, I speculate about some theoreti-
cal commonalities between the different types of sex dis-
crimination claims against Hooters, necessarily discussing
some rudimentary notions of feminist legal theory. In Part V, I
analyze some public statements made by the parties, or the
central combatants, involved in these controversies; specifi-
cally, I examine a press kit distributed by Hooters, a press
release published by the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission, and an advertisement published by Hooters. In
Part VI, I examine the public texts created by two lawyers who
debated in print on the subject in a lawyers' trade journal. In
Part VII, I move to a discussion of texts created by non-
lawyers, specifically a widely-read newspaper editorial and a
nationally broadcast radio commentary. Part VIII is a conclu-
sion.
I. BACKGROUND: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
As everyone knows, employers are generally forbidden to
discriminate among their employees based on sex. Sex dis-
crimination is specifically prohibited by Title VII of the Civil
[VOL. 31:3
Discourse About Sex Discrimination
Rights Act of 1964, which applies to discrimination in hiring
as well as discrimination among employees already hired.1 Sex
is one of five forbidden categories of discrimination specifically
named by Title VII;2 additional specific categories of discrimi-
nation in employment are forbidden by other statutes.3
It is of both historical and legal interest that the sex dis-
crimination provision was added rather belatedly to Title VII
when the Act was adopted in 1964; consequently, there is very
little in the way of legislative history describing precisely what
Congress had in mind by adopting that specific provision or
what sort of interpretations it would have preferred.4 Histori-
cally, sex discrimination in employment has remained socially
acceptable to a much later date, and in more ways, than has
race or religious discrimination.5 Further, while particular va-
rieties of race, religious, and national origin discrimination in
employment can frequently be traced to specific historical
moments, such as the competition for jobs between a new wave
of immigrants into the United States and those already
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Title VII generally applies only to em-
ployers who employ more than fifteen employees. See id. § 2000e(b).
2. The other four are race, color, religion, and national origin. See id. § 2000e-
2(a)(1).
3. For example, discrimination based on disability is forbidden by the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994); discrimination
based on age is forbidden by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994). Various state statutes forbid an even broader range of types
of discrimination. The Massachusetts statute, for example, forbids employment dis-
crimination based on "race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual
orientation, ... or ancestry," MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1997); age, see id. § 4(1B); arrest without conviction, first conviction of minor offenses,
stale misdemeanor convictions, see id. § 4(9); failure to report previous admission to
mental health care facilities, see id. § 4(9A); or handicap, see id. § 4(16). Rhode Island,
among others, forbids employment discrimination based on the results of genetic
testing. See, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 (1995).
4. See Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters
Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 168-
69 (1997). But see Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at
the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997).
5. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpre-
tations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (1990); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Patterson,
Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in
Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992)
(concluding that the courts have required more of sex discrimination plaintiffs than of
race discrimination plaintiffs); Paula J. Finlay, Note, Prying Open the Clubhouse Door:
Defining the "Distinctly Private" Club After New York State Club Association v. City of
New York, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 373-74 (1990).
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present,' sex discrimination appears to pervade Western cul-
ture from its earliest known antecedents.
Judicial decisions under Title VII have distinguished be-
tween two distinct varieties of illegal discrimination, called
"disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." Disparate
treatment sex discrimination is an overt difference in the way
men and women are dealt with as employees or applicants. For
example, refusing to hire women as executives would be a type
of disparate treatment sex discrimination.8 Disparate impact
sex discrimination, on the other hand, involves facially neutral
tests, standards, or rules that have the effect of making it
more difficult for one sex to obtain employment or promotion,
or to work within the employment environment.9 For example,
a height requirement, while not overtly or explicitly treating
the sexes differently, will have the effect of making it more dif-
ficult for one sex to obtain employment because the two sexes
tend to have a general height difference. So far as I can deter-
mine, all claims of discrimination against Hooters have been
based on disparate treatment rather than disparate impact
sex discrimination. Consequently, the remainder of this dis-
cussion will focus on disparate treatment.
In addition to the relatively simple type of discrimination in
which one sex is preferred over another, a second variety of
disparate treatment has been identified, sometimes called
"sex-plus" discrimination. In sex-plus discrimination, different
standards of conduct are required of female employees than of
male employees--or, to put it differently, the employer discrimi-
nates not against one sex as a whole, but against a subgroup
within that sex."° Consider, for example, a female employee who
6. See, e.g., Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal
Cases: Cinema Veritd and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH J. RACE & L. 347,
362-71 (1996) (analyzing the racism that developed following Chinese immigration to
the U.S.); Kenzo S. Kawanabe, Note, American Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Against Asian
Pacific Immigrants: The Present Repeats the Past, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 681 (1996).
7. See ELIzABETH FISHER, WOMAN'S CREATION: SEXUAL EVOLUTION AND THE
SHAPING OF SOCIETY (1979) (analyzing the socio-historic roots and perpetuation of
man's subjugation of woman). Some archeological evidence suggests that patriarchal
or male-dominant sex discrimination may not have existed prior to the advent of ani-
mal husbandry. See id. at 187-89.
8. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme
Court emphasized the distinction between the two types of discrimination in UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-98 (1991).
9. The statute has explicitly recognized disparate impact discrimination since
1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
10. Still another way of putting it is to say that "sex-plus" discrimination in-
volves discriminating against an employee based on her sex plus an additional
[VOL. 31:3
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is fired or denied a promotion because her behavior is "in-
sufficiently feminine." Strictly speaking, she has not received a
lower preference or priority because of her sex, but she has
been required to engage in a different class of performance be-
cause of it-presumably no man would be fired for being
insufficiently feminine. 1 This constitutes illegal disparate
treatment discrimination.
12
For purposes of this Article, it is also useful to focus on sex-
ual harassment, a form of behavior which has been recognized
as a form of disparate treatment sex discrimination violating
Title VII. 13 Generally speaking, the courts recognize two sepa-
rate forms of sexual harassment. The first, called "quid pro
quo" sexual harassment, consists of offering employment bene-
fits or opportunities (or threatening employment sanctions or
impediments) in exchange for sexual favors. 4 The second,
called "hostile environment" sexual harassment, involves the
characteristic. See generally Wendi Barish, Comment, "Sex Plus" Discrimination: A
Discussion of Fisher v. Vassar College, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 239 (1995).
11. There may be individual cases in which this presumption does not hold. That
is, one could imagine employment settings in which behavior culturally recognized as
"feminine" (e.g., empathy or nurturing) is expected of both males and females. Such a
hypothetical situation might stand on different footing.
12. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
13. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996). It is worth noting that harassment based on
race, color, religion, or national origin would also violate Title VII, although such
forms of harassment are infrequently discussed in the cases or the literature nowa-
days. The Supreme Court compared sexual and racial harassment in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986). See Peter E. Millspaugh, When Self.
Organization Includes Racial Harassment: Must the NLRA Yield to Title VII?, 2 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 1, 6-9 (1991). Catharine A. MacKinnon is generally credited
with the first theoretical explication of the concept of sexual harassment. See gener-
ally CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
14. See Rhee, supra note 4, at 169-71. It will be recognized that quid pro quo
sexual harassment fits into the category of "sex-plus" discrimination. See supra note
10 and accompanying text. That is, the harassed employee is being asked to adhere to
a different standard of conduct (engaging in some sexual contact with a supervisor, for
example) than would be required of her if she were of the other sex. This would apply
to quid pro quo harassment of male employees as well as female, and may hold true
even if the harassing individual were of the same sex as the harassed employee. See
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that same-
sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Christopher W. Deering, Com-
ment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Re-Examine the Legal
Underpinnings of Title VII's Ban on Discrimination "Because of" Sex, 27 CUMB. L.
REV. 231 (1996); Kara L. Gross, Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding:
Recognizing that Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK L.
REV. 1165 (1996); Trish K Murphy, Note & Comment, Without Distinction: Recogniz-
ing Coverage of Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REV.
1125 (1995); Regina L. Stone-Harris, Comment, Same-Sex Harassment-The Next
Step in the Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J.
269 (1996).
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creation of a work environment that is made hostile, offensive,
or intimidating for the particular employee because of her
sex. 5 Normally the environment must be so altered as to affect
a term, condition, or privilege of employment, although no spe-
cific damage or injury to the employee need be shown.' In all
cases the harassment must be unwelcome, and its severity
(that is, whether it actually does affect a term, condition, or
privilege of employment) is assessed from the perspective of
the reasonable victim, or as has been sometimes said, the
"reasonable woman."17
Employers are liable for acts of sexual harassment commit-
ted by supervisory personnel against subordinates, and also
for such acts committed by persons acting in an agency capac-
ity for the employer." Employers may be held liable for acts of
sexual harassment committed against employees by fellow
employees, or even by nonemployees, in situations where the
employer had reason to know of the harassment and failed to
take corrective action. 9 For example, if an employer learns
that one of its employees is being repeatedly harassed by a
particular customer, and the employer then fails to attempt to
prevent further acts of harassment by the customer, the em-
ployer may be held liable for subsequent acts of harassment by
15. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1996). Drucilla Cornell
has suggested an alternative definition of sexual harassment:
My definition of sexual harassment reads as follows: sexual harassment
consists of a) unilaterally imposed sexual requirements in the context of
unequal power, or b) the creation and perpetuation of a work environment
which enforces sexual shame by reducing individuals to projected stereotypes
or objectified fantasies of their "sex" so as to undermine the primary good of
their self-respect, or c) employment-related retaliation against a subordinate
employee or, in the case of a university, a student, for a consensually mutually
desired sexual relationship.
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 170 (1995).
16. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
17. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). For a lengthy recita-
tion of different court pronouncements on this standard, see Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d
625, 632 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997). This particular term may be misleading, though, since in
principle it is possible for a male to be the victim of sexual harassment. Nevertheless,
I like the term: it represents an ironic reversal of the traditional "reasonable man"
standard, which has sometimes been thought to exclude women from the category of
reasonable persons. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: the Rea-
sonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398 (1992);
Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 769.
18. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1996).
19. See id. § 1604.11(d)-(e).
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that customer. Of course, the degree to which the employer is
actually able to exercise control over what is done by a nonem-
ployee will be taken into account in determining liability 0
One well-established defense, and one theoretical possibility
of a defense, should be considered in light of the Hooters con-
troversies. First is the classic statutory defense to disparate
treatment claims, the bona fide occupational qualification, or
BFOQ. Title VII provides that an employer will not be held
liable for discrimination when sex, religion, or national origin
is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise."21 For example, an employer may legally refuse to hire
women as attendants for a men's washroom. The boundaries of
the BFOQ defense have gradually evolved since the enactment
of Title VII, and still are not entirely fixed. Courts consistently
acknowledge BFOQs when issues of sexual privacy are in-
volved, as in the washroom example above.2 Similarly, where
the hiring of one sex is needed for reasons of authenticity or
genuineness, as in the case of an actor, a BFOQ exists." On the
other hand, discrimination based on presumed qualities of, or
stereotypes about, the sexes does not present a BFOQ.' For
example, an employer may not refuse to hire female sales per-
sonnel on the grounds that women don't sell as well as men do.
Nor may an employer claim a BFOQ simply because of the
prejudiced preferences of co-workers or customers.25
The case of UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.2 ' held that a
BFOQ can exist only when the particular characteristic (e.g.,
sex) is actually necessary in order to enable the worker to per-
form her job. 7 In that lawsuit, women of childbearing age had
been denied certain employment opportunities because of fear
that lead in the workplace environment might be harmful to
any fetuses those women might conceive. The Supreme Court
held that an employer cannot base a BFOQ on such health
concerns of the employee or the employee's family-the em-
ployer's only proper inquiry is to the employee's ability to do
20. See id. § 1604.11(e).
21. 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
22. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir.
1996).
23. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1994).
24. See id. § 1604.2(a)(1).
25. See id. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii).
26. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
27. See id. at 206.
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the work required of her.28 On the other hand, the definition of
exactly what constitutes the "ability to perform the job" is less
clear than it might be. There have been cases involving female
guards in men's prisons, where courts have held that a BFOQ
exists because the reaction of the male prisoners to the female
guards would make the guards' ability to perform their work
materially more difficult, and would impair the functioning of
the prison.29
As to the question of whether the sex-appeal of a worker
qualifies as a BFOQ, the decisions are not entirely clear. I have
been able to locate only two decisions that appear to actually
have said, in dicta, that the employer was justified in dis-
criminating based on sex because the job involved being
sexually attractive to men. These were 1971 companion deci-
sions of the New York Human Rights Appeal Board (an
institution that was abolished not long afterwards) involving
the Playboy Club."0 These cases have been cited for that propo-
sition, but the purpose of the citation has been to distinguish
the case sub judice from the Playboy cases.31 To complicate
matters, three years later the appellate division upheld an-
other decision of the appeal board, holding that sex was not a
BFOQ for a restaurant that wished to attire female waitresses
"in alluring costumes" in order to "enhance petitioner's food
sales volume."2
Further, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.33 the court re-
jected the similar claim that sex appeal, and therefore sex, can
be a BFOQ for a flight attendant or ticket agent hired by a
28. See id. For a more detailed discussion of Johnson Controls, including an
analysis of its constitutive rhetoric, see Kenneth L. Schneyer, Talking About Judges,
Talking About Women: Constitutive Rhetoric in the Johnson Controls Case, 31 AM.
Bus. L.J. 117 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (holding that being
male is a BFOQ for the job of correctional counselor in a "contact" position in an Ala-
bama male maximum security penitentiary).
30. See St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 (N.Y
Hum. Rts. App. Bd. 1971); Weber v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 774, Case No. CFS
22619-70 (N.Y Hum. Rts. App. Bd. 1971).
31. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (holding that being female is not a BFOQ for airline flight attendants and ticket
agents).
32. Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 360
N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (App. Div. 1974), appeal dismissed, 330 N.E.2d 658 (1975). One con-
curring justice, however, questioned whether such a decision might be inconsistent
with the dicta in the Playboy cases. See id. at 939-40. (Reynolds, J., concurring). It
should be noted that the Guardian Capital case involved New York state law rather
than Title VII. See id. at 938.
33. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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commercial airline.3 In Wilson, it appears that the company
sincerely believed that female sex appeal was a device that
would attract male customers and engaged in active market-
ing to promote that strategy.35 The court, however, held that "to
recognize a BFOQ for jobs requiring multiple abilities, some
sex-linked and some sex-neutral, the sex-linked aspects of the
job must predominate."3 In the case of the airline, the
sex-linked job functions are only "tangential" to the es-
sence of the occupations and business involved. Southwest
is not a business where vicarious sex entertainment is the
primary service provided. Accordingly, the ability of the
airline to perform its primary business function, the
transportation of passengers, would not be jeopardized by
hiring males.37
The court held that sex does not become a BFOQ merely in
order to enhance a marketing strategy.38 The negative implica-
tion, however, of the language quoted above is that if a
business could show that "vicarious sex entertainment" was
the primary service it provided, then a BFOQ could be estab-
lished.
In the context of the Hooters problem, it is also worth
speculating about a theoretical possibility of a defense that
has never been adopted by the courts. Kelly Ann Cahill, in a
Note specifically discussing the Hooters disputes, has suggested
that an assumption of risk defense might be successfully em-
ployed against certain claims of sexual harassment committed
by the customers of a business." The theory is that female em-
ployees who voluntarily agree to work in such capacities as, for
example, topless dancers, are obviously aware that their work
is unusually susceptible to sexual harassment-that is, that
the risk of such harassment by the customers is higher there
than in other occupations. Consequently, an employee holding
34. Id. at 302.
35. See id. at 294-95. It should be noted, though, that the court in Wilson seri-
ously doubted that the sex appeal was actually necessary for the success of
Southwest's particular business. See id. at 295-96.
36. Id. at 301. This is the passage in which the court cites the dicta in the two
Playboy appeals. See id.
37. Id. at 302.
38. See id. at 303-04.
39. See Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk
Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 1107, 1144-53 (1995).
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such a job who was harassed by a customer would not, in tort
law, be able to recover for the injury because she voluntarily
entered into the situation knowing of the risk.0 A similar ar-
gument, of course, could be made about any type of dis-
crimination: for example, if an applicant voluntarily takes a
job at a location where he actually knows that members of his
religion are treated badly, then it might be argued that he has
assumed the risk of religious discrimination.41
I am inclined to disagree with Cahill's argument, because I
believe that there is a qualitative difference between tort law
and antidiscrimination statutes. The purpose of tort law is to
compensate plaintiffs for injuries and sanction wrongdoers,
while the purpose of Title VII is to prevent a particular sort of
behavior which Congress believes to be unacceptable in inter-
state commerce. Consequently, the damages suffered by the
plaintiff, and the question of whether she voluntarily brought
them upon herself, are not really the issue.42 Nonetheless, an
awareness of this concept may be useful in looking at the pub-
lic and popular texts created around the Hooters controversies.
II. THE LENS: CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC
The last quarter century has seen a revival of the tradi-
tional legal interest in literature and language. In spite of, or
40. See id. at 1144-53.
41. I am indebted to Mary Becker for this observation.
42. Similarly, the Supreme Court has rejected the equivalent of a "cause in fact"
argument in an age discrimination case. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g
Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1995). Cahill is aware of this line of reasoning and makes a
policy argument favoring an assumption of risk defense on the grounds that it would
result in "the recognition of the capacity of women to make voluntary choices about
where they work and to take responsibility for these choices." Cahill, supra note 39, at
1145. Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, in her more recent article discussing sexual harassment
at Hooters, considers Cahill's line of reasoning and rejects it. See Rhee, supra note 4,
at 190-94. Rhee's rejection of the assumption of risk defense, however, is based not on
the comparison between tort law and discrimination law, but on the assertion that the
sale of sexual appeal is not, or should not be, congruent with the sale of sexual har-
assment:
The potential availability of an assumption of risk defense for sexual harass-
ment compels women who commodify their sexuality essentially to consent to
their harassment and abuse. The notion that women have the right to assert
their sexuality in the public domain but must suffer all the harmful social con-
sequences is equivalent to a denial of that right.
Id. at 194.
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perhaps because of, the contemporary tendency to speak of le-
gal issues as problems to be solved with the tools of social
science, a growing number of scholars are embarking on stud-
ies that assume that law is one of the humanities.43 There is no
single "movement" or direction that characterizes this group of
scholars other than their focus on the places where law and
literature can inform one another or may benefit from similar
types of analysis."
I believe that five distinct strains can be identified. First,
there are those who believe that lawyers, judges, legislators,
and "law" itself need to learn the lessons that literature can
teach about humanity. They find the suppositions contained in
lawyers' work frequently to be too abstracted, or based too
much on cultural assumptions that are problematic at best; in
literature, they believe, we can see how these assumptions or
abstractions fail when confronted with the experiences of
people.45 Second, there are those who believe that they can
use tools of literary criticism to interpret such legal texts as
43. Compare JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EsSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW x-xii (1985) with Paul J. Heald, Economics as One of the Humani-
ties: An Ecumenical Response to Weisberg West and White, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 293,
310-12 (1995).
44. See James Boyd White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto," 39 MERCER L.
REV. 739 (1988). An interesting and different layout of this movement may be found in
Robin L. West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 PAC. L.J. 1187, 1187-88 (1996).
45. See John Denvir, "Deep Dialogue"-James Joyce's Contribution to American
Constitutional Theory, 3 CARDOzO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 1 (1991); Dmitry N. Feova-
nov, Luna Law: The Libertarian Vision in Heinlein's The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, 63
TENN. L. REV. 71, 72-74 (1995); Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stew-
ing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74
NEB. L. REV. 742 (1995); Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Lit-
erature and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1936 (1990); Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte,
Bloom and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177
(1988); Vanessa Laird, Dueling Narratives in An American Tragedy and the Criminal
Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 131 (1991); David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice
in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279 (1987); Amy R. Mash-
burn & Dabney D. Ware, The Burden of Truth: Reconciling Literary Reality with
Professional Mythology, 26 U MEM. L. REV. 1257 (1996); Martha Minow, Identities, 3
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (1991); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or En-
riched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1201, 1214-18 (1992) [hereinafter Minow, Stripped Down]; Martha Minow, Words
and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1665, 1687-88 (1990); Amy D. Ronner, Amathia and Denial of "In the Home" in
Bowers v. Hardwick and Shahar v. Bowers: Objective Correlatives and the Bacchae as
Tools for Analyzing Privacy and Intimacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 263 (1994); Elizabeth
Tobin, Imagining the Mother's Text: Toni Morrison's Beloved and Contemporary Law,
16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 233 (1993); Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman:
One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1988); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and
Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
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statutes, cases and, above all, the Constitution. They bring
their (usually postmodern) critical faculties to bear on such
concepts as original intent, legislative history, and stare deci-
sis. 6 Third, there are those who are interested in how law
becomes represented in such cultural artifacts as literature
and film: how do people see the law, and what do they think
of it? What influence do legal institutions appear to have on
society as a whole?" Fourth, there are those who use creative
storytelling and personal narrative as a way of informing
theoretical legal points."'
A fifth avenue, the one informing this Article, has been
called "constitutive rhetoric.'4 9 One may look at any text as a
46. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); INTERPRETING LAW
AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds.,
1988); Betsy B. Baker, Constructing Justice: Theories of the Subject in Law and Litera-
ture, 75 MINN. L. REV. 581 (1991); Kenji Yoshino, Note, What's Past is Prologue:
Precedent in Literature and Law, 104 YALE L.J. 471 (1994).
47. See BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1987);
RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 51-
92 (1992); Alan D. Boyer, Formalism, Realism and Naturalism: Cross-Currents in
American Letters and Law, 23 CONN. L. REV. 669 (1991); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Ar-
tistic Convention and Natural Law: Didactic Treatment of Justice and Authority in the
Works of Fielding, Hawthorne, and Fritz Lang, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 483 (1990); Nancy E.
Johnson, Women, Agency, and the Law: Mediations of the Novel in the Late Eighteenth
Century, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 269 (1996); Penelope Pether, Jangling the Keys to the
Kingdom: Some Reflections on The Crucible, on an American Constitutional Paradox,
and on Australian Judicial Review, 8 CARDOzO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 317 (1996);
Paul Joseph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the Federation: Images of Law, Lawyers
and the Legal System in "Star Trek: The Next Generation," 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43
(1992); Larry M. Wertheim, Law as Frolic: Law and Literature in A Frolic of His Own,
21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 421 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM GADDIS, A FROLIC OF HIS
OwN (1994)). -
48. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PER-
MANENCE OF RACISM (1992); Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative
Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989); Sally Frank, Eve Was Right to Eat the
"Apple ": The Importance of Narrative in the Art of Lawyering, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
79 (1996); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Richard K Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical
Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994). You
have probably observed that these four approaches are not mutually exclusive. For
example, a work of literature like The Merchant of Venice might be examined both for
the popular perception of the legal system contained in it and for its prescriptions
about humanity from which the legal system could afford to learn. For a sampling of
different commentaries on The Merchant of Venice in legal scholarship, see Kenji
Yoshino, The Lawyer of Belmont, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 183 (1997).
49. This term was coined by James Boyd White, who regularly uses it in his
scholarship. White's own work is probably the best exposition of the analysis of consti-
tutive rhetoric. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN
LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS (1994) [hereinafter WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE]; JAMES
BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM
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conversation in which the writer or speaker is attempting to
establish or maintain a relationship with the reader or lis-
tener. (I say "attempting," but I am not speaking of the
subjective desires of the individual holding the pen; rather, I
mean the voice of the author as it appears in the text itself.)
This relationship also includes some sort of connection with, or
attitudes concerning, any people who (or topics that) are dis-
cussed in the text. The relationships thus sketched out may be
seen as a sort of "constitution," a blueprint for how these inter-
relationships are going to work. How is power to be divided
up? What is the role to be played by the listener? What sorts of
things may the listener think about or do to the third parties
who are mentioned?
Going further, the relationships or constitution created by a
text may be seen as a normative statement about how the
world should work. That is, by creating a set of relationships
in the text, the writer makes an implied declaration that these
are the sort of relationships one ought to create if one has the
power. For example, if my text bases its ethos on the notion
that I am a morally superior person, and therefore ought to be
believed, I have impliedly said that morally superior people
ought to be believed because of their moral superiority. Since
the text may be taken as recommending a way of relating to
the world and to other people, it can and should be critically
examined from an ethical and political viewpoint. Is this text
creating a good set of relationships? If this language were the
constitution of a city-state, defining your role in it, would you
want to live there?
Consider: what if one were to write a book that created one
set of relationships while recommending another? For exam-
ple, what if I wrote that "all persons are entitled to equal
respect in their beliefs," while simultaneously using rhetoric
that flatly denied respect to the beliefs of anyone but myself
(1990); WHITE, supra note 43; JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN
THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973) [hereinafter WHITE, LEGAL
IMAGINATION]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTI-
TUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY (1984)
[hereinafter WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE]; James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer
Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)). My own work
has been mostly based on constitutive rhetoric. See Kenneth L. Schneyer, Avoiding the
Personal Pronoun: The Rhetoric of Display and Camouflage in the Law of Sexual Ori-
entation, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1313 (1994) [hereinafter Schneyer, Avoiding the
Personal Pronoun]; Kenneth L. Schneyer, The Culture of Risk: Deconstructing Mutual
Mistake, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 429 (1997); Schneyer, supra note 28.
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and implied that such respect was neither necessary nor
proper? In such a case, the literal meaning of the text itself
would be called into question. You might conclude that I (the
author's voice, not the author) did not really believe in ac-
cording equal respect to all views but was lying about it. You
might conclude that I did not believe in that form of recom-
mendation but was being ironic. You might conclude that I was
trying to teach you something about the nature of recommen-
dations, of respect, or of persuasion. In any case, it would be
impossible simply to take that sentence at face value; the con-
stitutive rhetoric would change the meaning of the text. It
would also lead you, at some level, to question the relationship
you have with me, as reader to writer. °
The constitutive rhetoric of a text is a serious matter, espe-
cially in a legal text. What we do to people, in real life and
with real power, is enabled by the relationships we imagine we
have with them; these relationships are created by texts. It is
no coincidence, for example, that countries at war routinely
use dehumanizing rhetoric to talk about the enemy; the rheto-
ric creates a relationship in which doing the otherwise
unthinkable-deliberately killing another person-becomes
not only acceptable but commendable. Of course the weapons
to wage war, and the physical strength to do it, exist anyway;
but the will to pull the trigger comes from the ways in which
people are able to think about doing the deed. In a real sense,
what we say shapes what we do.
You see that I have not recommended a particular ethical
system or political view as the starting place for such an
analysis. This is deliberate, but for mixed reasons. First, this
sort of rhetorical analysis is more of a tool for finding the ethi-
cal and political presuppositions of a text than it is for finding
a set of ethical or political rules with which to appraise one of
those presuppositions. To that extent, it is possible that people
with contradictory ethical or political views could use rhetori-
cal analysis to arrive at similar conclusions about what the
rhetoric means, but opposite conclusions as to whether that
meaning is a good one. On the other hand, I think there are
some ethical or political viewpoints that may be impossible to
view favorably using constitutive rhetoric. This is because con-
50. At this point it is inevitable that you will begin to engage in precisely that
sort of assessment of your relationship with me. That we have a relationship, and that
I play a large part in shaping it, is one of the theses of this Article; that you should
critically appraise that relationship is one of the things that I am arguing is desirable.
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stitutive rhetoric necessarily involves looking at relationships
and communities between people-this presupposes that we
do have such things as relationships and communities and
that they do have an ethical dimension. Consequently, a form
of rhetoric in which people were tools for the use of others, or
in which a rugged individual entirely disclaimed any responsi-
bility for, or consideration of, other individuals' interests,
would appear rather unattractive in this system. In that
sense, this tool is probably more useful to those who believe
that people should be treated as ends in themselves than to
those who believe that the needs, hopes, and desires of indi-
viduals are components in a large social utility.5'
III. THE HOOTERS CASES THEMSELVES
Hooters is a restaurant chain that originated in Clearwater,
Florida, in the early 1980s; in the mid-1990s it is the fastest-
growing restaurant chain in America. It serves such fare as
hamburgers, chicken wings, and fried fish sandwiches, as well
as wine and beer.52 The restaurant is supposed to simulate a
"beach party" environment, with decor including bare wooden
floors and walls, and tables with bar stools. The servers in this
restaurant are exclusively young women, and are officially
referred to as "Hooters girls.""3 These servers are usually
dressed in a uniform consisting of a halter or tied tee shirt
with the restaurant logo on the front, orange running shorts,
and sneakers.54 The logo on the shirt is the word "HOOTERS"
superimposed over a drawing of an owl; the oversized eyes of
the owl form the two O's in the name. The servers are
generally instructed to be friendly with customers, including
sitting at the table and talking to them.55 According to the
51. See WHITE, supra note 43, at 3-26, 192-212 (framing the contrast between
treating people as a means to an end and treating people as ends in themselves); see
also IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35-44 (James W
Ellington trans., 2d ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1785). Since I obviously find this
method useful, I must be one of the former rather than the latter.
52. See Bill McDowell & Charles Bernstein, Big Guns: 1995s Hottest Growth
Companies, RESTAURANTS & INSTITUTIONS, Aug. 1, 1995, at 56; see also Jack Hayes,
Hooters Clones Scramble for Share of Florida Market, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS,
Jan. 13, 1992, at 1.
53. See McDowell & Bernstein, supra note 52.
54. See id.; Rhee, supra note 4, at 163-64 & n.4.
55. See Robyn E. Blumner, Hooters Has a-Right to Sell Sex, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 5,
1995, at B7; Carrie Stetler, Where Skimpy Clothes Arrive with the Order, STAR-LEDGER
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chain's marketing information, the servers are supposed to
give the impression of "cheerleaders" or the "girl next door.""'
The restaurant is decorated with various posters and signs of
a humorous nature, many of which could be taken to have
sexual connotations. The menu is replete with humor of a self-
deprecating nature; for example, the restaurant history on the
back of the menu suggests that the founders are amateurs who
don't know what they are doing. The chain's clientele are
primarily adult males, although some women and children do
dine there.57
There appears to be some confusion about the restaurant's
primary marketing focus. Certainly in the wake of recent legal
disputes, Hooters has been claiming that it is primarily in the
business of selling sex appeal.58 However, at times there have
been challenges, usually in zoning boards, to placing a Hooters
restaurant in some communities. In those communities, Hooters
bills itself as a "family restaurant,"59 a term which is susceptible
(Newark, N.J.), Dec. 4, 1995. In a conversation, however, one server told me that the
restaurant would not tolerate having patrons attempt to touch the servers.
56. See Blurner, supra note 55, at B7; Stetler, supra note 55. In various articles
criticizing or supporting the restaurant, there have been assertions that servers at
Hooters are generally large-breasted; indeed, the word "hooters" is supposed to be a
slang term for breasts. See Stetler, supra note 55. While writing the first draft of this
Article, I visited the only Hooters restaurant in Rhode Island. If I had to characterize
the servers' physiques, I would say that they were extremely thin. I did observe, how-
ever, that all the servers I saw were white, and most were blonde. Although my
observations do not necessarily describe Hooters restaurants in general, it does seem
fair to comment that the appearance of the "girl next door" rather depends on where
you live.
57. See Deborah L. Rhode, PC. or Discrimination?, NATL L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at
A19; Mike Rosen, The Feds Would Do Well to Spend a Little Time Tending Bar Them-
selves, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Jun. 1, 1996, at Bl; Estela Villanueva,
Council Delays Action on "Hooters" Restaurant, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 9, 1993, at 1.
58. See James E. Causey, Giving a Hoot: Chain Takes on the EEOC, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1995, at 1; Mark Patinkin, Sometimes Raising a 'Hue 'n' Cry"
Doesn't Make Sense, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 5, 1995, at 2; Rhode, supra note 57, at
A19; Stetler, supra note 55.
59. See Dwayne Atwood, Ruling Limits Hooters, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec.
12, 1995, at D1 ("Owners and promoters have billed Hooters as a family restaurant.");
Denise Cardinal, Hooters Girls on Endangered Species List, BUS. REC., Dec. 11, 1995,
at 19; Joel Kurth, Liquor Board Doesn't Give on Hooters, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May
14, 1997, at D4 ("Restaurant officials [say] that they operate a 'family establish-
ment.'"); E. J. Montini, In Defense of 2-Edged Monikers, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1995,
at B1 (regional director says Hooters is a family restaurant); Holly Selby, NOW Has
Bone to Pick with Hooters at Harborplace, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 3, 1990, at 1A; Vil-
lanueva, supra note 57, at 1 ("Larry Klinghoffer, owner of the Omaha and possibly the
Des Moines Hooters, touted the eatery as a casual, family restaurant with a Florida
beach theme.'); Jim Wieker, Beer-less Hooters Starts Tapping Market, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Apr. 22, 1997, at A12, ("Hooters managers argue it's a family restaurant that
doesn't have to sell liquor to stay in business."); Teresa Wiltz, Many Give a Hoot About
Discourse About Sex Discrimination
to the interpretation that the restaurant's primary focus is not
the selling of sexuality.
Beginning in the early 1990s, a number of sexual harass-
ment lawsuits have been filed against Hooters by servers
working at different Hooters locations. These lawsuits usually
complain of inappropriate or aggressive sexual overtures by
patrons, as well as alleging that Hooters deliberately creates
an environment that encourages such harassment.0 A few of
the cases also allege various forms of harassment by supervi-
sors."' So far as I have been able to determine, all of these
cases (save the most recent one, which is still pending) have
been settled out of court."2 As noted above, these cases have
given rise to speculation that an assumption of risk defense
may be appropriate for some sexual harassment cases.63
In December 1993, Savino Latuga and David Gonzales, two
men, filed an employment discrimination complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois (Chicago) against the local Hooters and the chain entity
itself, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII be-
cause they were not hired as servers."4 The plaintiffs sued as
representatives of the class of men denied employment at
Hooters because of sex. 5 In its answer, Hooters alleged, inter
alia, that sex was a BFOQ for the job of "Hooters girl."66 This
lawsuit was settled out of court in October of 1997.67
Apparently at the same time that the Latuga cases were
proceeding, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) was conducting its own independent investigation of
Mt. Prospect Eatery, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1992, at 1 ("At a recent Village Board meeting,
Hooters representatives described the restaurant as a 'family-style' operation that
would not have a bar and would serve beer and wine only with meals.").
60. See Rhee, supra note 4, at 164-65.
61. See, e.g., Kevin Murphy, Hooters Case Goes to Trial, WIs. ST. J., Feb. 5, 1997,
at 3A.
62. See Rhee, supra note 4, at 165. The recent, still-pending case was filed in the
United States District Court in Madison, Wisconsin. See Murphy, supra note 61.
63. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
64. Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93-C-7709 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 23, 1993). In Octo-
ber 1994, John Ginter and Patrick Salisbury filed a similar complaint. Ginter v.
Hooters, Inc., No. 94-C-6338 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 20, 1994). In December 1994, an
amended, consolidated class action complaint was filed combining both cases.
Amended Consolidated Action Complaint, Dec. 16, 1994, Latuga v. Hooters, Inc.
[hereinafter Class Action Complaint]. In April of 1995, the court ordered the consoli-
dation of the cases. See Minute Order, Apr. 6, 1995, Latuga v. Hooters, Inc.
65. • See Class Action Complaint, supra note 64.
66. See Amended Answer to Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Dec. 5, 1995,
Latuga v. Hooters, at 39.
67. See Adam Zagorin, Sexism Will Be Served, TIME, Oct. 13, 1997, at 65.
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Hooters's hiring practices. The exact contours of this investiga-
tion are not public knowledge, but it is known that late in 1995
the EEOC sent a lengthy conciliation offer to Hooters. The
only aspects of this offer which are known to the public are
those specifically mentioned later by Hooters in its press kit. 68
On November 15, 1995, Hooters held a press conference con-
cerning the EEOC investigation and commenced an advertising
campaign criticizing the EEOC for the investigation. 9 While
these advertisements have taken various forms, the central
legal assertion behind all of them is that sex is an obvious
BFOQ for a server in a Hooters restaurant.70 As mentioned
above, a very large number of newspaper editorials were writ-
ten based on this press release, mostly favoring Hooters's side
of the argument. Various members of Congress made public
statements criticizing the EEOC.7 In April or May of 1996, the
Chairman of the EEOC, Gilbert F. Casellas, apparently sent a
letter to a member of Congress in which he indicated that the
EEOC would not be pursuing the investigation, largely due to
scarcity of resources. 2 This letter was "leaked" to the press
and caused another set of editorials to be written.
IV. UNDERLYING THEORETICAL ISSUES
The two different discrimination-based attacks on Hooters-
the sexual harassment cases and the cases alleging discrimina-
68. HOOTERS OF AMERICA, INC., PRESS KIT OF NOv. 15, 1995 [hereinafter PRESS
KIT] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). While Hooters
has overtly and enthusiastically publicized certain aspects of the EEOC investigation,
such as the length of the agency's 1995 settlement offer and some of the demands
contained in it, see Hooters Says No to EEOC Demand It Hire Hooters Guys in PRESS
KIT, supra, neither the EEOC nor Hooters has been willing to publish the full text of
any document between them nor the details of the investigation process. Aware that
the EEOC had already stated that it could not make any comments concerning the
pending investigation, I contacted Hooters's attorneys to request a copy of the settle-
ment offer. The request was declined.
69. See PRESS KIT, supra note 68; infra notes 90-96.
70. See, e.g., WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at A10.
71. See Rosen, supra note 57, at Bll; Hostettler Condemns Demands on Hooters,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 24, 1995, at 2B.
72. See Chuck Hutchcraft, Hooters Case Won't Get a Second Look, CHI. TRiB.,
May 2, 1996, § 3, at 1. At the time of my conversations with Hooters's attorneys in
May of 1996, the EEOC had not made any official representation to Hooters that the
investigation would be dropped or that it would decline to sue. (This was the reason
for their understandable reluctance to release documents which might be relevant in
a lawsuit that could still occur.) The letter from Casellas to Representative Fawell
seems to be the only indication that this is the EEOC's intention.
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tion against male applicants-are different legal articulations of
the same underlying question: how legitimate is it to base a
business on the sale of female sexuality, female sexual appeal,
or female sexual services?7" It could be said, for example, that
the reason there may be sexual harassment problems at Hoot-
ers is because Hooters is overtly trading on the sexual appeal
of its women servers, consequently causing some confusion in
the minds of some patrons. The patron confuses sexual display
with sexual availability, and consequently engages in harass-
ing behavior. Absent the overt sexual display, the patron's
confusion (and harassing behavior) would be reduced or elimi-
nated. Similarly, the BFOQ argument that the job of a server
at Hooters (a "Hooters Girl") can be performed only by a
woman is based on the assertion that the core marketing
strategy of the business is to sexually attract and titillate het-
erosexual males. In each case, one suspects that the plaintiffs
or investigators might like to argue that a restaurant may not
legitimately provide vicarious sexual services.74 Yet it is diffi-
cult to make this argument within the language of any specific
statute, because no statute has yet been interpreted to forbid
such services per se, and it is difficult to see how any extant
statute could be so interpreted.75 Instead, opponents of Hooters
couch their arguments in terms of "sex discrimination in em-
ployment" because that is all they have to work with.
However, it is worth considering whether the very nature of
the sexuality-based restaurant could be construed to offend
Title VII. One view of Title VII would say that such a business
directly implicates the precise reasons that laws against sex
discrimination are necessary. The cultural, political, and eco-
nomic reasons behind employment discrimination against
women were all based on assumptions concerning what
women could, or should, do. Because women were perceived as
73. Jeannie Sclafani Rhee writes that "[a]t its core, the debate over the liability
of Hooters restaurants for third-party harassment of its female employees can be
viewed as a proxy for the debate over the ethics of the commodification of women's
sexuality." Rhee, supra note 4, at 180.
74. In at least one of the harassment suits, such a claim was emphatically not
the position of the plaintiffs, who discharged their attorneys for making that claim at
all. See id. at 186.
75. I am disregarding, here, the morass of local ordinances involving strip clubs,
pornographic movie houses, and adult bookstores, as well as the complex First
Amendment implications thereof. See generally Alfred C. Yen, Judicial Review of the
Zoning of Adult Entertainment: A Search for the Purposeful Suppression of Protected
Speech, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 651 (1985) (discussing the inherent tension between a com-
munity's right to provide for its social welfare and the individual's right to freedom of
speech).
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having limited roles-all related to sexual contact with men,
childbirth, child-rearing, or maintaining the home-there
tended to be prejudice against their working in occupations
that did not directly involve them in those roles. Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination in employment, therefore,
can be seen as a direct attack on existing cultural, political,
and economic arrangements concerning the proper role of
women in society, the family, or the economy. This is why hos-
tile environment sexual harassment has been interpreted to be
a violation of Title VII as it was originally enacted: women
who are subjected to continual sexual treatment on the job are
essentially being placed back in the roles from which Title VII
was supposed to free them. Title VII, it could be argued, is de-
signed to give women a function in the workplace other than a
function dependent on their relationship to men. It could be
argued that a business whose whole purpose is to trade on
those older assumptions-insisting that women be sexual ob-
jects, child-raisers, or homemakers-is engaging in and bol-
stering the very practices Title VII was designed to fight.
The branch of feminist legal analysis identified with
Catharine MacKinnon takes a "dominance approach," rather
than a "difference approach," to equality law generally and sex
discrimination law in particular. The theory maintains that
the key question in sex discrimination law is not whether a
practice treats the sexes differently from one another, but
rather, whether this practice perpetuates the subordination of
women by men."' Utilizing this theory, one could argue that
Hooters should be seen as perpetuating the domination of men
over women because the commodification of sexuality within
Western culture consistently converts the seller (nearly always
female) into the servant of the buyer (nearly always male).77 As
Jeannie Sclafani Rhee summarizes the argument:
The construction of female sexuality is one of submission
to dominance. Yet the construct is so pervasive that its
inequality cannot be seen, and it is merely taken as the
norm of sexuality. The problematic construct of female
sexuality is what makes its objectification so harmful, and
76. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281 (1991) (describing the historic subordination of women by men and the
failure of traditional legal analysis to solve the problem).
77. Edwin M. Schur discusses the fact that males are predominantly buyers, and
females predominantly sellers, in the sex industry. See EDWIN M. SCHUR, THE
AMERICANIZATION OF SEX 84-86, 89 (1988).
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in turn what makes its commodification, even by women
themselves, a most dangerous proposition .... The con-
struction of women's sexuality is tainted to the degree
that any commodification of it only acts to reify its mala-
drous effect on the social psyche.78
The post-structuralist feminist counter-argument, ably made
by Rhee herself, is that the commodification of sexual display
gives women a unique economic and social power that they
have in few other venues. To forbid the existence of businesses
whose purpose was to sell sexuality would deny women the
opportunity to exercise that power.79 Rhee goes further, saying
that sexual harassment
can be recast as a man's recognition of the power that
women's bodies temporarily hold over him, and the resul-
tant attempt to possess that power for himself-literally
to strip it physically away from women. The consequent
attempt to redress sexual harassment ought not to as-
sume the same form. Rather than stripping women of the
power of their own sexuality, the response must prohibit
men from seizing public displays of female sexuality as
theirs for the taking.8'
Thus, for some, the empowerment of women and women's
sexuality not only permits, but demands that businesses like
Hooters be allowed to exist.8'
78. Rhee, supra note 4, at 185. For a work by a nonlawyer making essentially
this same charge against Hooters and similar businesses, see Sarah Ciriello, Corn-
modification of Women: Morning, Noon, and Night, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE
CULTURE 265 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993).
79. See Rhee, supra note 4, at 185-90.
80. Id. at 189.
81. The difficulty, for me, in this line of reasoning is that it operates on the
assumption that the servers-the "Hooters Girls" themselves-are empowered and
enriched by this form of commodification. Rhee is aware that many women working in
the sex industry "are commonly ... the most marginalized and disempowered of the
community such that their 'choice' to commodify is in essence a false choice." Id. at
187. She points out, however, that the same cannot be said for highly-paid women who
display their sexuality, such as film stars and models. See id. Certainly there are those
workers in the sex industry-as in any industry-whose services are so in demand
that they themselves become powerful forces within it. But such an observation
cannot be useful in assessing the lot of the average worker in that industry, any more
than one can judge the lot of most actors by examining the life of Harrison Ford. In
the sex industry in general, and at Hooters in particular, the persons profiting from
the display of sexuality are almost all men. See SCHUR, supra note 77, at 83-90; see
also Ciriello, supra note 78, at 267-74. If a Hooters restaurant existed at which the
servers themselves were the owners and therefore profited directly from the
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On a cultural level, the debate over the ethics of commodi-
fying sexuality is surely part of what is going on in the debate
about Hooters. Many editorials begin with the assertion that
Hooters is clearly offensive, but that its offensiveness does not
render it illegal."2 The rebuttals usually stick to the letter of
Title VII, and attempt to argue about the "true" function of
Hooters." The "true function" question is a good starting place,
because it is unclear that a restaurant can claim that sexual-
ity is its true function if an airline such as Southwest cannot
make the same claim.' Further, there is a factual question as
to whether Hooters actually believes that sexual appeal is its
core function. Apparently its arguments to hostile zoning
boards included the assertion that Hooters's core identity is
that of a "family restaurant"-yet most Americans would
probably deny that the concept of a "family restaurant" can be
reconciled with the overt sale of sexuality." Yet in all of these
concessions about the offensiveness of Hooters, there is very
little speculation as to why Hooters is offensive, or what rela-
tion its offensiveness may have to the economic place of
women in society.
I would argue that the editorial writers, lawyers, and
others who write about these cases are actually attempting
to discuss the cultural legitimacy of sexuality-based business.
There is a certain reluctance to do this, both because
American law pretends not to speak on cultural issues and
because there is a strong libertarian streak in our culture
that believes that any sort of sexually-based behavior
involving consenting adults should be a private matter not
subject to the criticism of others. Consequently, the language
used by these writers is couched in technical terms such as
commodification of their sexuality, then it would be much easier to accept Rhee's line
of reasoning. In such a case, of course, lawsuits for sex discrimination of any kind
would be impossible because the servers would not be "employees" within the
meaning of the statute.
82. See, e.g., Blumner, supra note 55; Judicious Retreat on Hooters, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, May 5, 1996, at 2D; Tom Teepen, Hooters Case Follows Discrimination Law Out
the Window, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 1995, at 14.
83. See, e.g., Mary Jane Hall, Why a Hooters Debate? Read the Civil Rights Act,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Dec. 12, 1995, at A16; Rhode, supra note 57.
84. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
85. The very notion of what should be presented to a "family" is controversial. I
was surprised, for example, to learn (second hand) that the producer of a popular tele-
vision series had claimed, "this is a family show, and we've learned that families like a
lot of violence." (As the comment is hearsay, and as I have the permission of neither
the producer [a friend of a friend] nor my source to quote it, I am disinclined to name
names.)
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employment discrimination, about which we can pretend that
we do not have a cultural or spiritual attachment.
In an article like this one, maintaining that "good language"
can be used by either side in an argument, and promising fur-
ther that it will assess the language regardless of the
substantive outcome, it is important for the writer to be candid
about his own prejudices and predilections on substantive
questions. Without such candor, the reader may justifiably
suspect that an analysis of "language" is being used merely as
a device to persuade the reader of the rightness of the writer's
desired outcomes. Therefore I will be explicit about where my
sympathies lie on the "merits" of these disputes: I don't like
female sexuality used as a marketing tool or a business device
because I think it runs counter to the notions of equality and
equal opportunity that are central to the aspirations behind
Title VII; I also think that it demeans both the workers and
the customers. On the other hand, if I accept arguendo that
the core of Hooters's business is truly the sale of sexuality,
then, based on the strict language of Title VII, I am not sure
that I can escape the conclusion that such a business deserves
to claim that sex is a BFOQ-and I am loath to do an "end
run" around the legislature based merely on my own beliefs. (I
actually have quite a bit of sympathy for the "dominance" ap-
proach to equality law, but I am certain that no such approach
was behind the passage of any but a discrete and well-
publicized group of statutes.) Finally, based on my one and
only visit to Hooters, undertaken while I was writing my first
draft of this article, I am not sure that I really believe that
sexuality is as central to Hooters's business as has been
claimed. The sexuality, in fact, seemed rather understated
when compared with much in contemporary culture, and was
less interesting than the self-effacing humor on the back of the
menu. You should be aware of these biases of mine when you
read what follows in the Article."
86. As I have noted elsewhere, the act of displaying my biases is, in and of itself,
a valuable rhetorical device. By displaying my prejudices, I cause you to believe that I
can be trusted to tell the truth, that I am not trying to mislead you. See Schneyer,
Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note 49, at 1342. But is that misleading in and
of itself? Could an unscrupulous writer use such a device to yet more subtly influence
the reader to adopt his substantive views? I hope not. What I hope I am doing is
teaching you about language by pointing out that even one's own rhetoric is subject to
scrutiny. You should assess my rhetoric just as I am assessing the rhetoric of those
texts discussed in this Article. I suppose that it might be possible for me to do this
myself-that is, stand outside of my own language and analyze it. But I don't think I
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V. QUASI-OFFIdIAL SPEECH:
PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE "PARTIES"
Judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, such as litigation or
administrative enforcement, are political acts taking place in a
political context. It is axiomatic and, perhaps, pass6 to say
this, but it is sometimes easy to forget that civil disputes take
place in a government context. The statutes at issue are cre-
ated, the judges or administrators are appointed, and the
structure of the entire system is developed and amended
through the political process. Parties frequently worry as
much (or more) about the popular perception of their dispute
as the formal judicial or administrative result.
One reason is that popular or political pressure can affect
the outcome of a proceeding; this is not supposed to happen,
but judicial and administrative officers are human beings,
prone to as much self-doubt and ambiguity as the rest of us.
Only the most robust of us can remain truly convinced, in the
light of lopsided, vitriolic criticism, that we are right. In the
alternative, popular sentiment may succeed in changing the
very laws around which the dispute revolves. Further, in dis-
putes involving business, the bad publicity associated with a
lawsuit can be as damaging to the company as any legal or eq-
uitable remedy provided by a court or agency-or the good
publicity may substantially increase profits. The same can be
said of political figures, whose careers may be ruined by the
existence of the dispute even if their side of the argument is
entirely vindicated by the outcome. In criminal law as well, an
accused person is not necessarily "off the hook" simply because
she is found "not guilty.""7
trust myself to carry out such an exercise with any kind of dispassionate distance, nor
can I think of a way to convince you that I am capable of it.
87. This fact-that the public perception of a civil or criminal case can be more
important than the case's technical outcome-has always been well known and ex-
ploited by authors of literature. Consider the following plea of a defense attorney in a
famous mystery novel:
On my client's behalf--on Miss Vane's behalt my lord, I beg your lordship's in-
dulgence for a few words. A charge has been brought against her, my lord, the
very awful charge of murder, and I should like it to be made clear, my lord, that
my client leaves this court without a stain upon her character. As I am in-
formed, my lord, this is not a case of the charge being withdrawn in default of
evidence. I understand, my lord, that further information has come to the police
which definitely proves the entire innocence of my client. I also understand, my
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As a result, we frequently see concerted efforts, especially in
cases involving prominent persons or entities, to affect public
opinion. The parties or their representatives regularly make
public statements about the case, not only in response to re-
porters' questions but spontaneously, in lengthy interviews or
press conferences. They develop public personae that may (or
may not) be entirely different from those they adopt in court.
Because this is rhetoric directly aimed at public opinion, it
may be overtly constitutive: the speakers are aware that they
are addressing a broader community, appealing to its self-
conception and aspirations. In this sense, litigants speaking to
the public have more in common with political speechmakers
than with lawyers in a lawsuit. They deliberately define a col-
lective identity in order to mobilize it."
As described above, the EEOC's investigation of Hooters re-
sulted in a conciliation offer which Hooters found unpalatable.
Hooters responded, on November 15, 1995, by holding a press
conference and engaging in an expensive advertising campaign
criticizing the EEOC for its investigation. This section of the
Article is devoted to an examination of the public statements
made by Hooters in this conference and campaign, and by the
EEOC in reaction to it. In this discussion, I wish to pay par-
ticular attention to the type of community Hooters and the
EEOC appear to be envisioning in their exhortations.
A. The Hooters Press Kit
The press kit distributed at the time of the press conference
on November 15, 1995 contains a number of separate items: a
lord, that a further arrest has been made and that an inquiry will follow, my
lord, in due course. My lord, this lady must go forth into the world acquitted,
not only at this bar, but at the bar of public opinion. Any ambiguity would be in-
tolerable ....
DOROTHY L. SAYERS, STRONG POISON 340-41 (Garland Publishing 1976) (1930). De-
spite the wholehearted support of the prosecutor and the judge in this effort, it
appears in later Sayers novels that the accused has been anything but acquitted "at
the bar of public opinion." See DOROTHY L. SAYERS, HAVE His CARCASE (1932);
DOROTHY L. SAYERS, GAUDY NIGHT (1936).
88. For detailed examinations of the constitutive rhetoric of some political
speeches, see WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE, supra note 49, at 275-302. See also Dan F. Hahn,
Ask Not What a Youngster Can Do for You: Kennedy's Inaugural Address, 12 PRESI-
DENTIAL STUD. Q. 610 (1982); Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note 49,
at 1339-40.
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press release; 9 a "question & answer" sheet;9° a "backgrounder"
on the dispute;91 a "fact sheet" about the chain;92 statements by
Mike McNeil (Hooters's vice president of marketing),93 Cheryl
Whiting (director of training for Hooters of America),94 and
Meghan O'Malley-Barnard (a self-described "Hooters Girl")95
as well as their biographies;' articles from the National Law
Journal lampooning the EEOC9 and the Latuga case;98 a re-
cent trade journal article describing fast-growing food service
companies;" a summary of Hooters's charitable giving;1  and a
list of Hooters locations. 1 While these documents are different
in type and quality, they display an instructive uniformity in
tone and content. They were clearly drawn by the same hand
for the same purpose.
Probably the most significant document in the press kit is
the press release, entitled "Hooters Says No to EEOC Demand
It Hire Hooters Guys: Restaurant Chain Says Federal Agency
Needs Common Sense.""° This release is the document most
likely to be read, quoted, or used as the basis of an editorial. It
contains about 500 words, primarily quotations from Mike
McNeil's statement. Like most press releases, it is designed so
that a verbatim transcription could be used as a traditional
newspaper article. It is written in the third person, attributes
all of Hooters's positions to McNeil or Whiting, and is cast so
as to appear to be an objective report of the facts. Essentially
the only facts it contains, however, are summaries of Hooters's
opinions and position.
89. Hooters Says No to EEOC Demand It Hire Hooters Guys, in PRESS KIT, supra
note 68.
90. Questions and Answers About BFOQs and the EEOC, in PRESS KIT, supra note
68.
91. Backgrounder: EEOC Complaint Against Hooters, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
92. The Hooters Companies: Fact Sheet, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
93. Statement by Mike McNeil, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68 [hereinafter McNeil
Statement].
94. Statement of Cheryl Whiting, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68 [hereinafter Whiting
Statement].
95. Statement of Meghan O'Malley-Barnard, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68
[hereinafter O'Malley-Barnard Statement].
96. Biographies, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
97. Gerald D. Skoning, Employment Law's '7bp Ten List for '94, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9,
1995, at A21.
98. Gerald D. Skoning, Employment Law's Thn Best of'93, NA'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994,
at 15.
99. McDowell & Bernstein, supra note 52.
100. Hooters of America Charitable Giving, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
101. Hooters Locations, in PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
102. Hooters Says No to EEOC Demand It Hire Hooters Guys, supra note 68.
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Here are the opening paragraphs of the press release:
HOOTERS SAYS NO TO EEOC DEMAND IT HIRE
HOOTERS GUYS
Restaurant Chain Says Federal Agency Needs Common
Sense
Washington, D.C.-The Hooters Restaurant chain said to-
day that it will resist EEOC demands that it hire men to
work as "Hooters Girls," a proposal that Hooters officials
and franchise owners say would drive them out of business.
Hooters of America Vice President Mike McNeil said that
conciliation talks between Hooters representatives and the
EEOC floundered because Commission demands would
have imposed unmanageable financial and practical bur-
dens on every one of Hooters' 170 stores.
"The issue isn't sex discrimination. It's common sense,"
McNeil told a press conference at which he announced a
grassroots campaign to convince the EEOC to leave
Hooters alone and direct its energy toward genuine
discrimination problems.
"The EEOC has a backlog of about 100,000 cases. It's hard
to believe that forcing Hooters to change its business con-
cept by hiring 'Hooters Guys' should be one of its top
priorities," McNeil added.
10 3
Throughout this document, the use of a reportorial, third-
person voice has a powerful effect. First of all, it sounds dis-
passionate: it is hard to remember that we are not seeing the
observations of a disinterested, outside party. This is all the
more striking when we consider that newspapers frequently
print press releases, with no alteration, as stories. Indeed, as
noted above, that is precisely the function the press release is
designed to serve. Were a newspaper to use this press release
in that way, the reader of the resulting newspaper story
would have no way of knowing that the sentences were
drafted by Hooters representatives with the specific intent of
influencing public opinion.'" In this sense, the press release
103. Id.
104. Naturally the journalists reading the press release itself know, as I know,
that it is a manipulative device; consequently, the misleading character of the release
does not apply to them. Indeed, the overtly manipulative character of this particular
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creates a kind of rhetorical lie: the newspaper reader is cued
to receive a verified, reasonably removed report of the actual
facts, when in fact every word has been crafted as a device to
influence the reader. How much more on our guard would we
be if the press release simply said, "We are Hooters and here
is our opinion"?"'
Second, the reportorial voice disassociates itself from its
own views. The phrases, "Hooters says," "McNeil said," or
similar language appears over and over again. Yet in actual
fact, as we know, this document was drafted by Hooters itself,
its public relations firm, its attorneys, or possibly even by
McNeil. The impact of this disassociation is striking, because
Hooters's views are actually given more prominence by this
device. It is one thing to say, "I want to tell you my views"; it is
another to say, "I want to tell you what Schneyer said about
his views." In the latter case, we are impliedly told that the
views are so noteworthy as to motivate the first listener to re-
peat them. We repeat the views of others less often than we
express our own; typically we do not engage in such repetition
unless there is something worthwhile, or at least interesting,
about what was said. At a minimum, saying "I want to tell you
what Schneyer said about his views" tells the listener that at
least two people are interested in this topic: Schneyer and the
speaker.
Third, the reportorial voice-whose typical function is to
recount events as they occur-makes it appear that something
has actually happened here. In fact, all that has really
happened is that Hooters has expressed its opinion; but the
reporting of that opinion as an event ("The Hooters Restaurant
chain said today that it will resist . . .") gives one the
press release makes it less likely that it will be used in its current form as the actual
text of a story. My point, however, is that if it were so used, the reader would be mis-
led. In this sense we might hold the newspaper ethically responsible for failing to
sufficiently edit the release before putting it in print. But since Hooters knows that
releases are used as stories and it is trying to create such a story, the use of such de-
liberately manipulative rhetoric is worthy of comment. As to the argument that one
can be as manipulative as one likes to people who know that one is trying to manipu-
late them, see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
105. Of course, critical theory in general and feminist theory in particular have
long recognized that claims of objectivity are frequently tools for the dominant class to
legitimate its own perspective as the "real" one. This claim of objectivity, therefore,
might be seen as an inherently patriarchal device. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMs,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1742-45 (1976); Ann C. Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986).
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impression that one is seeing a play in a sporting event or a
battle in a war. It is not merely speech; it is action. The
reportorial style of the press release, then, serves to give the
reader the impression of an objective report of an important
event, rather than of an entirely instrumental, persuasive
device that reports nothing but what its writer believes. In
this sense, its language is fundamentally dishonest."
The headline and sub-headline of the release are clearly
aimed at ridicule. Hooters is cast as the firm parent (it "says
no"), disciplining the absurd and stupid EEOC that wants
Hooters to hire "Hooters Guys," a phrase that is clearly de-
signed to call up a ridiculous image of a man in a "Hooters
Girl" uniform.07 Hooters diagnoses the EEOC's problem (as
parents frequently do) as a lack of "common sense," something
Hooters apparently is supposed to have in abundance.
The first sentence is designed to cast the EEOC in the role
of the aggressor. The agency is making "demands" designed to
"drive" Hooters "out of business," while Hooters is only
"resisting." The choice of the word "resist" is instructive, because
unlike other appropriate verbs ("oppose," "deny," "refuse,"
"decline," "reject," "spurn," or "balk"), that word has strong he-
roic connotations, invoking resistance to tyranny, resistance to
oppression, and the Resistance to Fascism and Nazism. Not
only is the EEOC the aggressor, then, but Hooters is the val-
iant warrior holding back the behemoth; the biblical image of
David and Goliath 8 is almost inescapable. In addition, the
EEOC, here and throughout the release, is referred to in the
singular, without reference to any particular human being or
group of people associated with its viewpoint. Hooters, on the
other hand, is consistently mentioned in connection with
groups of individuals: "Hooters officials and franchise owners,"
"Hooters representatives," "Hooters Girls," and so forth. This
gives the impression that the EEOC is inhuman and mono-
lithic, while Hooters is made up of people whose views are
important and influential in the Hooters organization.
The various documents in the press kit repeatedly refer to
the BFOQ defense in almost the same words. Close facsimiles
106. As will be seen, the EEOC press release responding to Hooters entirely
avoids any pretense of reportorial style, but is a frank expression of opinion. In this
sense it must be considered more honest, although it has problems of its own. See
infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
107. As will be seen, Hooters published an advertisement in which exactly that
image appeared. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
108. See 1 Samuel 17.
SPRING 19981
580 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
of the sentence, "a French restaurant has the right to hire only
French waiters, and a women's exercise gym may choose to
hire only female locker room attendants," appear no less than
five times in the different parts of the press kit.'0 9 One of these
is the statement by Cheryl Whiting, director of training for
Hooters of America, Inc., who apparently started "in 1987 as a
Hooters Girl," but nonetheless "has more than ten years of
management experience ... in the food and beverage indus-
try.""0 Whiting's biography does not indicate that she has ever
attended college (while it does indicate McNeil's college educa-
tion),"' but her statement, which is devoted to the view of
"working people" towards the dispute, contains the following
sentence:
Besides, the law recognizes that some jobs require unique
qualifications: to be a waiter in an authentic French res-
taurant, you can be required to be French. It follows that
to be a Hooters Girl, you have to be female."'
It is surely plausible that a high school graduate, especially
one with extensive management experience, would have some
familiarity with the BFOQ defense;"' but it is unlikely that
she would spontaneously and independently arrive at the
same example (the French restaurant) used by McNeil and all
of the other papers in the press kit. We can hypothesize, there-
fore, that a deliberate decision was made to use the BFOQ and
the French restaurant example in as many different docu-
ments as possible, in order to maximize the probability that it
would find its way into news stories and editorials."'
109. See PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
110. See Biographies, supra note 96. Since Whiting's biography was released in
1995--only eight years after 1987-her "ten years of management experience" imply
that she began as a "Hooters Girl" after having acquired management experience in
another food service establishment. I point this out because it is unexpected that
someone who has previously worked in management would then begin working as a
server in a restaurant-a job that is usually thought of as having limited wages,
authority, and prestige. One suspects that there is some story not being told here.
111. See id.
112. Whiting Statement, supra note 94.
113. My own undergraduate students usually have never heard of it, but they may
not be a typical sample.
114. Some restraint seems to have been shown, however, in the name of verisi-
militude. The line was apparently drawn at having Meghan O'Malley-Barnard, a 27-
year-old dancer and acting student, mouth Title VII case law. See O'Malley-Barnard
Statement, supra note 95; Biographies, supra note 96.
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In this light, it is interesting to observe the nuances of
grammar and structure used in the Whiting statement. Whit-
ing's version of the BFOQ, using the colloquialisms such as
"besides" and the impersonal second person, is clearly less
formal than the other versions of that concept, which use more
complex sentence structure and sophistication than Whiting's.
McNeil's statement, for example, puts it this way:
And, I think you should know that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 explicitly allows businesses to establish hiring rules
that take into account factors such as gender or ethnicity
when these factors are necessary to maintain the essence of
a particular business. For example, a French restaurant has
the right to hire only French waiters, and a female exercise
club could decide to hire only female locker room attendants.
We are convinced that this same standard allows Hooters to
hire only women for jobs as Hooters Girls.115
If one were writing a play or novel in which different char-
acters explained the same concept, it would be only natural
to show them explaining it in different ways; but in that case
the particular differences given to the characters would be
highly significant."' Given that they received their informa-
tion about BFOQs from the same source (and, indeed, that
the same source probably wrote much of both statements),
there has been a decision to have them express themselves
differently. McNeil, the male, college and business school-
educated Vice President in charge of marketing, speaks in
complex and sophisticated sentences; Whiting, the female,
high school-educated former "Hooters Girl," expresses the
same concepts in simpler, unsophisticated language and with
less reliable logic. In the community imagined by this text,
male executives have a strong command of language and
logic; female ex-"Hooters Girls" have less-although they ap-
pear to have access to more information than, say, the
115. McNeil Statement, supra note 93.
116. One could, indeed, rest the entire literary core of the work on the differences
between those explanations. In this way, the varying rhetoric creates the texture of
the characters and their significance in the work. Shakespeare is justly famous for
this. For a look at the differing sorts of rhetoric used by different Shakespearean
characters in the same play, see WHITE, LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 49, at 51-56.
For a look at this powerful device used by Shakespearean characters in a political
context, see WHrrE, ACTS OF HOPE, supra note 49, at 47-81.
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average person on the street, who probably would not even be
aware of the BFOQ defense.
B. The EEOC Press Release
On December 21, 1996, six days after the Hooters press kit
was distributed, the EEOC issued its own, short press release:
EEOC COMMENTS ON HOOTERS' PRESS OFFENSIVE
Washington-Any legally sophisticated employer such as
Hooters is well aware that the EEOC is prohibited by law
from publicly discussing any pending investigation. As a
result, we can neither confirm nor deny the existence of
an ongoing investigation against Hooters or any other
employer. The EEOC, therefore, cannot respond to the
public relations offensive recently initiated by Hooters.
We feel it important to point out, however, that a private
class action lawsuit-in which the EEOC is not a party-
was brought in December 1994 by individual men who
believe that they were discriminated against by Hooters'
hiring practices. The case is pending in federal court in
the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago).
Given the pendency of this private action, we fail to un-
derstand what Hooters is seeking to accomplish through
this expensive, well-orchestrated campaign other than to
intimidate a federal law enforcement agency and, more
importantly, individuals whose rights may have been ille-
gally violated."'
The contrasts between this press release and the Hooters
press release are striking. In light of my earlier discussion, the
first thing that stands out is the complete lack of any pretense
of objectivity or reportorial style. This press release does not
appear to tell the facts as a reporter would-it is openly
stating the Commission's own views. In this sense the EEOC
release is more rhetorically honest than the Hooters release,
117. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMMENTS ON HOOTERS'
PRESS OFFENSIVE (Nov. 21, 1995), available in 1995 WL 854490.
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insofar as the reader might be misled by the implied objec-
tivity of the latter.
Next most striking is the position from which the EEOC
chooses to make its remarks: it will not comment on the sub-
stance of the dispute, as it says is forbidden to do, but instead
will comment on the fact of the Hooters release and subse-
quent advertising campaign. This raises the interesting
question of why the EEOC bothers to comment at all if it can-
not comment on substance; surely no negative consequences
would ensue from its silence on this subject."8 Yet this release
does contain something very close to commentary on the sub-
stance. For example, there are three reasons for the EEOC to
mention the Latuga case: To point out that the EEOC is not
alone in its skepticism concerning Hooters's hiring practices;
to suggest that Hooters's ire is misdirected, since the initial
complaint came from private individuals; and to cast suspicion
on Hooters's motives for launching its public relations cam-
paign. This is a vivid contrast to McNeil's statement, in which
the Latuga litigation is mentioned in order to suggest that the
EEOC's investigation of Hooters's practices is entirely unnec-
essary, since "men are going to get their day in court-without
intervention by federal bureaucrats."" 9
Just as the Hooters press release cast the EEOC as the ag-
gressor, so the EEOC press release casts Hooters as the
aggressor. The difference, though, is that the aggression the
EEOC sees in Hooters is entirely contained in Hooters's public
relations efforts. Hooters is a "legally sophisticated employer"
engaging in a "press offensive," "public relations offensive," or
"expensive, well-orchestrated campaign." The choice of words
here is designed to portray Hooters as a wealthy, powerful, and
well-informed manipulator of the media. This contrasts with
Hooters's portrayal of the scene, in which Hooters was the
collection of gallant individuals fighting the faceless colossus
represented by the EEOC.
Further, the EEOC implies that Hooters is not just power-
ful, but crafty. The press release suggests that Hooters's
motives in engaging in its public relations efforts are to in-
timidate government agencies and individuals in order to
prevent them from engaging in their legitimate legal pursuits.
118. Indeed, the EEOC release seems to have had just about as much effect as si-
lence; few of the editorials written about this subject display any awareness that such
a release was even distributed.
119. McNeil Statement, supra note 93.
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Further, the Hooters press release exploits the EEOC's legally
mandated silence by making a loud noise when it knows the
EEOC cannot respond.
The agency itself, by contrast, is portrayed as an even-
handed dispenser of justice. It calls itself a "federal law
enforcement agency," piously and demurely reminds Hooters of
its legal inability to speak, and points out that the Commis-
sion's responsibilities apply not only to Hooters, but to "any
other employer." The EEOC emerges as a straight-faced, calm,
and "untouchable" cop that will neither allow itself to be
drawn into accusations of unfairness nor stoop to respond to
ridicule of its actions or motives.The reader is clearly imagined to be allied with the EEOC
against the manipulative tactics of Hooters, sympathetic to the
hopes of Latuga and his co-plaintiffs, and trusting of law
enforcement officers to do their duty. Notably, the reader is not
supposed to be a passive receiver of truth from the mouth of
the EEOC; the agency deliberately avoids giving substantive
information that could be taken as truth.20 From this point the
reader's role is to engage in further investigation and testing:
to look at the court case in Chicago, to look into Hooters's
motivation and tactics, to see the whole scene anew.
In this sense, the EEOC document may be seen as coming
much closer to approaching an ideal of "dialectic" than the
Hooters documents. Where Hooters consistently and repeat-
edly hammers away at the same substantive points, ridiculing
the EEOC's efforts and pointing out the absurdity of the situa-
tion in objective-sounding language that is designed to be
wholly believed, the EEOC leaves the reader in a position
where she must engage in further thinking and investigation
and cannot take the EEOC's words at face value. The EEOC
makes no rhetorical claims of objectivity and points out that
Hooters is not objective either, creating a deliberate imbalance
that opens a discussion without closing it.
120. Again, it is worth noting that although the EEOC stands by its obligation to
remain silent as to the substantive issues in a pending investigation, it could have
chosen to remain entirely silent. Its choice to provide the reader with enough informa-
tion to wonder about Hooters's tactics, but not enough information to reach a final
decision, is instructive.
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C. A Hooters Advertisement
As part of the advertising campaign that began simultane-
ously with its press conference, Hooters took out a number of
full-page advertisements in national newspapers. Each of
these advertisements was designed to show, in a humorous
way, the apparent absurdity of the EEOC's position: in legal
terms, each was asserting the existence of a BFOQ for female
servers at Hooters. I will discuss one such advertisement here.
The central image in the advertisement, located at the left
side of the middle of the page and taking up about half its to-
tal height, is a photograph of a large, muscular, mustached
man wearing a blonde wig, a large bra (apparently padded), a
Hooters tank top and running shorts. He is staring into the
camera with a wild-eyed, open-mouthed grin, as though sing-
ing a long note on the word "hey." In his right hand he carries
a plate of food, apparently chicken wings; his left hand is
raised to mid-waist, and the index finger is bent as if beckon-
ing. The top third of the page is taken up with the large-print,
boldfaced headline, "The Latest From / THE FOLKS WHO /
Brought You the / $435 HAMMER." To the right of the man's
image, the following text appears:
Government bureaucrats come up with some pretty crazy
ideas-like paying $435 for a hammer or spending $1.8
million researching blueberries. Almost everybody in
America agrees it's time to rein them in.
But some federal bureaucrats still don't get it. How else to
explain the equal employment regulators' demand that
Hooters restaurants begin hiring "Hooters Guys?"
For a restaurant chain whose essence is the aHooters
Girls," the regulators' ideas are a recipe for business disas-
ter. Here's just some of the things Washington bureaucrats
want Hooters to do:
Teach Hooters employees to be more sensitive to
"men's needs" by providing sensitivity training.
Establish a scholarship fund to enhance job or
education opportunities for men.
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* For the next five years, require Hooters' owners
to have key business decisions approved by a
federally mandated "administrator," who must
report to the EEOC.
The government has a 100,000 case backlog of job dis-
crimination claims. It's hard to believe that replacing
"Hooters Girls" with "Hooters Guys" is one of the EEOC's
top priorities.
12 1
Beneath the man and the text, a medium-sized footer ap-
pears: "COME ON, WASHINGTON-GET A GRIP." Beneath
that, the Hooters logo appears, followed by the words, "It's
time for a little common sense." Finally, at the very bottom, in
the smallest print on the page, appear the words, "Paid for by
Hooters, Inc., Hooters Management Corp., and Hooters of
America, Inc.," with the address following.'22
This advertisement operates on many different levels at
once, employing a variety of rhetorical devices. First and most
obvious is the photograph of the man in the wig and outfit.
The expression on his face, together with the surrounding text,
show that he is supposed to be an absurd parody of the
EEOC's position. The significance of this particular image-
the cross-dressing man-should not be underestimated. A man
dressed as or impersonating a woman is a signal, to many, of
male homosexuality. Its representation cannot but produce an
emotional response in a large number of viewers, particularly
the heterosexual males who are Hooters's target clientele. Im-
ages of male homosexuality can be profoundly threatening to
the identity of heterosexual males whose self-concept may de-
pend on the maintenance of a strong masculine persona.22 The
almost psychotic look of desperate glee on the man's face, com-
bined with the beckoning left hand, invites the viewer to
believe that he is being asked to participate in a gender-
bending activity of identity-crushing proportions. Further, the
121. Hooters, Inc., Advertisement, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at A10.
122. See id.
123. I have made this argument at more length in Schneyer, Avoiding the Per-
sonal Pronoun, supra note 49, at 1323-25. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has explored the
related notion of "homosexual panic" in EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY
OF THE CLOSET 19-21 (1990). Sedgwick also speaks of how sexuality implicates those
who hear about it (in a way that race and religion do not). See id. at 75-82. Kenneth
L. Karst has spoken of the way in which traditional sex roles have powerful influence
over our identities in Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J. 447,
459-60.
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particular man in this picture, muscular and mustached, is a
far cry from the stereotypical image of an effeminate male-a
distinction that is threatening for two reasons. First, if it could
happen to him it could happen to you; second, he might be
powerful enough to compel you. This, the picture seems to say,
is the end result of hiring men at Hooters: your own sexuality
is at risk.
But the photograph rests on unstated, unproven, and
possibly false assumptions. Why imply that men hired by
Hooters would wear the same uniform as women? If they did
wear a similar uniform (tank tops, tee shirts, and running
shorts are essentially unisex clothing), why assume that the
men would wear bras and wigs? Why, indeed, assume that any
sort of gender-bending, non-heterosexual, or ambiguous result
would come at all? If the women are dressed to sexually
titillate men, then it might be logical for the men to be dressed
to sexually titillate women.'24 In the alternative, the women
could continue to serve the function of sex appeal while the
men would not. The advertisement's assumptions come from
Hooters's underlying assertion: that its survival depends on
the "Hooters Girl" concept, and that any dilution of that
concept would be fatal. Consequently, since the only kind of
server Hooters has is a Hooters Girl, it follows that any man
hired would be hired as a Hooters Girl; hence the absurd,
threatening picture.
By using this picture as the centerpiece of its advertise-
ment, Hooters creates a link between its marketing strategy
and American male identity. The government's attempt to al-
ter Hooters is presented as tantamount to an attempt at
wholesale emasculation. We cannot be real American men un-
less Hooters is allowed to be Hooters.
The two most prominent pieces of text in the advertisement,
the only ones that can be read at more than arm's length, are
the header "The Latest From / THE FOLKS WHO / Brought
You the / $435 HAMMER," and the footer "COME ON
WASHINGTON-GET A GRIP." The header, which is clearly
linked to the photograph (the man in the picture is "the latest
from the folks") associates the well-known Defense Department
124. A number of editorials (on both sides of the discrimination issue) made pre-
cisely this suggestion, going so far as to say that a new restaurant ought to be started
with men dressed for the entertainment of women. The most commonly suggested
name for this restaurant was "Buns." See, e.g., Donna Reynolds, Editorial, Men
Wouldn't Allow Restaurant About Them, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Dec. 1,
1995, at A19; Joan Vennochi, Who Gives a Hoot?, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1997, at D1.
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spending debacles of the early 1980s (in which disproportion-
ately large amounts of money were paid for cheap tools and
supplies) with current EEOC anti-discrimination policies. This
analogy is striking because there is no real connection between
the two. They occurred in two different agencies, following dif-
ferent procedural rules, in different situations. More signifi-
cantly, the Defense Department problems originated not in the
crazy ideas of government regulators, but in the dishonest
billing practices of private defense contractors; the govern-
ment's sin was the failure to catch the billing practices because
of its own poor or outdated purchasing practices.'25 Contrary to
the text of the advertisement, "paying $435 for a hammer" was
never an "idea" of "government bureaucrats." In a way, then,
Hooters is drawing our attention to the opposite of the real
events: it implies that the EEOC's attempt to control private
business is congruent with the Department of Defense's fail-
ure to control private business. Since this is obviously wrong,
then why make that connection?
The key here, as in many of the texts discussed in this arti-
cle, is the concept of "common sense." The "Hooters Guy" and
the "$435 hammer" are presented as similar in that they both
are things with which the ordinary person would disagree. In
the text of the article, the reference to "spending $1.8 million
researching blueberries"-a transition between the "$435
hammer" and the idea of hiring men at Hooters-is designed
to bolster the notion that the federal government generally of-
fends common sense. The transition works this way: the first
case presents government officials who do not have the com-
mon sense to rein in spending; in the second, government
officials do not have the common sense to know that a study of
blueberries is not worth $1.8 million; in the third, government
officials do not have the common sense to know that Hooters
must hire only women. The first two deal with spending, the
third does not; but the last two both involve things approved of
(not merely neglected) by government officials.
In this way, all odd things done by the government are con-
flated into a single, massive loss of common sense. The
advertisement plays on the general sense of alienation late
125. See generally James J. Graham, Suspension of Contractors and Ongoing
Criminal Investigations for Contract Fraud: Looking for Fairness from a Tightrope of
Competing Interests, 14 PUB. CONT. L.J. 216 (1984) (examining the way "present prac-
tices, regulations, procedures, and judicial opinions attempt to fairly accommodate the
various interests in the context of an allegation of fraud and the use of suspension
during the pendency of the criminal investigation").
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twentieth-century Americans have about their institutions in
general and the federal government in particular, as well as
the age-old distrust of the average citizen for the intelligentsia
and the professional classes. It may well be, for example, that
spending $1.8 million on the research of blueberries turns out
to be a useful thing, when one has considered the reasons be-
hind the research and its probable benefits. But the ordinary
person, who generally would know neither the reasons nor the
benefits, would never consider such a thing. Stated baldly,
without any of the supporting information, the expenditure
simply looks foolish. Yet if those in power are routinely doing
foolish things, then all of us are in jeopardy. Hooters presents
itself as a victim of the random, unpredictable silliness of radi-
cal, isolated intellectuals and bureaucrats who wield dangerous
amounts of power. The advertisement suggests that what hap-
pened to Hooters is waiting to happen to all of us unless
something is done. Consequently, the footer, urging "Washing-
ton" (a single entity) to "get a grip" (an easy thing to do), is de-
signed to be the cry of all outraged citizenry at all government
shenanigans. A restaurant chain is everyman.
The text of the advertisement, like several documents con-
tained in Hooters's press kit,2 " refers to four specific requests
apparently made by the EEOC in its conciliation offer: com-
pensation for displaced victims, employee training, scholarship
funds, and EEOC supervision. In discussing these four refer-
ences, it is important to remember, first, that the whole
conciliation offer was apparently many times longer than
these three items: various documents in the press kit suggest
that it was 80 pages long, including appendices.'27 Second, we
should remember that no one, including Hooters, has made the
conciliation offer public. All we know about the offer is the
very small amount that Hooters has made public in its press
kit and advertisements.
This presents Hooters with a common problem in rhetoric:
how to be a trustworthy reporter of facts that are known, in
detail, to the writer, but which the writer can recount only in
heavily digested form. This is a problem I faced myself in an
earlier article, when I was discussing documents in a lawsuit
that were available only to those who actually went to the
courthouse to find them. In response to that problem, I said:
126. PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
127. See generally PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
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[To speak about a document in this case, I must be care-
ful to explicate its text and context clearly, since my
reader will not (generally) be able to verify my claims. For
example, I am about to recite the basic facts of the case.
To do this, I am relying on the fact summaries appearing
in the summary judgment papers filed by the parties. I
will try to avoid stating any fact that is disputed, or I will
point out a dispute where it occurs, but you are in the
(possibly uncomfortable) position of relying on me to do
this job well.'28
Hooters is in the identical position with regard to the con-
ciliation offer. It has exclusive access to the document, and is
able, in a brief advertisement or press release, to give us only
small pieces of it. Consequently, we must rely on Hooters to
give us a fair representation of what that offer contained.
But to what extent, if at all, does Hooters present itself as a
trustworthy reporter of that information? We know, after all,
that Hooters has an axe to grind in this matter; does it also
give us reason to believe that it is giving us a fair presentation
anyway? It does not do the obvious thing, that is, make the en-
tire conciliation offer publicly available for inspection. Such a
publication would have tremendous rhetorical value, because
it would demonstrate Hooters's willingness to let the public
judge the facts for themselves, without filtering. Alternatively,
Hooters could make explicit the fact that it is merely summa-
rizing nonrepresentative samples of a much larger and more
complex offer. In a sense Hooters does do this, saying in the
advertisement that the bullets represent "just some of the
things Washington bureaucrats want Hooters to do," and re-
peatedly referring, in the press kit, to the length of the
conciliation offer. Yet that phrasing makes it appear that the
samples are representative and that the rest of the offer is
128. Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun, supra note 49, at 1347-48
(footnotes omitted). You should notice that I stand in precisely the same position with
regard to the Hooters press kit: While it is probably easy for you to obtain various
newspaper articles and editorials heavily based on the press kit, the kit itself is some-
thing to which I have access and you do not-unless you care to make your way to the
editorial offices of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform in beautiful Ann
Arbor and look at their copy yourself. Consequently, as in the lawsuit reported in my
earlier article, I must be very careful to show you where my information comes from
and the extent to which I am summarizing it. In a footnote of that earlier article, I
point out that the very act of telling you about this rhetorical problem creates an en-
hanced level of trust between us. See id. at 1348 n.111. Note the similarity between
this argument and the one made in supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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similar in tone, intent, and strategy. Of course we have no way
of knowing whether this is the case, but it seems unlikely. A
third possibility would be to make an explicit attempt to pres-
ent the EEOC's position in addition to Hooters's own. There is
no such attempt.
Consequently, the relationship of the reader to Hooters is
clear and, indeed, familiar. This is advertising, and we are
supposed to buy what is sold. We are given no opportunity to
make an independent evaluation of the dispute because
evaluation is not our role. The advertiser has decided which
version of the facts is the most effective message, and its hope
is that we will believe that version. This is either highly re-
spectful or highly disrespectful of the reader. The general
claim of advertisers is that consumers are presumed to be ma-
ture, intelligent, and able to see an advertising pitch for what
it is; consequently, balanced information in advertising is not
necessary-indeed, it would be presumptuous and paternalis-
tic to include such a balance, because it would imply that the
consumer is not able to take care of herself.
If we believe the underlying claim, then the advertisement
holds the reader in high esteem, because it expects the reader
to deconstruct it. The same, presumably, could be said of all
advertising.
Such an interpretation is flawed, however. While any text
may be torn apart by a reader who is sufficiently alert, or who
does enough research to find its contradictions, it is inaccurate
to say that a text invites such dissection unless there are clues
within the text itself signalling the reader that the informa-
tion is incomplete. 29 I found the flaws in the advertisement
because I was looking for them and spent many hours refining
my thoughts about it, but it would be unrealistic to say that
the advertiser expected me to do so. On the whole, it would be
more accurate to say that advertising in general and this ad-
vertisement in particular expects the reader not to engage in
such ruminations; indeed, since the advertisement is designed
to be effective with the broadest practicable range of viewers,
presumably, it would be counterproductive to aim at only those
who have the leisure to engage in more in-depth research. 130
129. I argue that exactly such signals appear in the EEOC press release, supra
notes 117-18, 120 and accompanying text, and in the commentary by Laura Archer
Pulfer, infra notes 209-10, 213-14, 217 and accompanying text.
130. In the securities field, of course, this is precisely the target audience required
by federal law. The advertisement itself is essentially useless without the prospectus,
which must be separately obtained. The theory is that investors can indeed make
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On the contrary, while the reader may have the intrinsic
ability to critique them, most advertisements are designed in
the expectation, indeed the hope, that that ability will not be
exercised. They are designed in the hope that their deliberate
omission of facts will not be noticed. Therefore, it would be
disingenuous to claim that such omissions are respectful be-
cause they assume that intelligent readers will take adver-
tising with a grain of salt."' Advertising in general and this ad
in particular treat their readers as means to an end.
VI. LAWYERS TALKING TO EACH OTHER:
THE DEBATE IN THE ABA JOURNAL
For more than ten years, the ABA Journal, published
monthly and distributed to all members of the American Bar
Association, has printed an "At Issue" column, in which cur-
rent controversies of interest to the legal profession are
debated. The column customarily poses each controversy as a
leading question (e.g., "Should contingency fees be abolished?")
and contains one article arguing the affirmative and one ar-
guing the negative. Each article is about 500 words long, and is
written by a lawyer, law professor, judge, or similar legal pro-
fessional who has some expertise in the area. Typically each
author is, or has been, engaged in litigation or advocacy fa-
voring the result for which she argues. Although these articles
often involve policy questions, occasionally they involve the
interpretation of the law.
This format is reassuringly familiar to the lawyers who read
the column-it resembles the type of appellate brief we were
taught to write in law school. Its distillation of an issue into a
single question with either a positive or negative answer, its in-
sistence on brevity, and its choice of writers predisposed to
argue in favor of one side or the other all serve to remind law-
yers of their own view of how disputes should be discussed. This
intelligent decisions, but only when they are provided with accurate and complete
information. See J. Robert Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and
the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U L. REV. 93, 93 n.2 (1986); Richard
S. Hardy, The New Gold Rush: The Last Frontier of the Securities Laws?, 29 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 359, 364-65 (1989).
131. The irony here is similar to that in Burton Lane and Alan Jay Lerner's fa-
mous song, How Could You Believe Me When I Said I Love You When You Know I've
Been a Liar All My Life? The most well-known version of this song may be seen and
heard in the film ROYAL WEDDING (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1951).
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is the world the way lawyers know it; consequently, we auto-
matically appreciate this way of talking, and are led to believe
both that it expresses something meaningful about disagree-
ments and that it gives us a good basis for making decisions.
Yet there is much that can be said against such a model. For
one thing, few controversial issues are so simple that they can
profitably be posed as a single "yes/no" question. Such a
method inevitably avoids the complexities involved in difficult
questions, causing both reader and writer to imagine that the
issues are considerably less difficult than they are."'
In its February 1996 issue, about two months after Hooters
held its press conference, the ABA Journal published an "At
Issue" column with the title, "Sex Discrimination: Does Refus-
ing to Hire Men as Food Servers Violate the Civil Rights
Act?"133 The column specifically concerned the EEOC investiga-
tion of Hooters (probably prompted by the press coverage), and
the introductory paragraphs preceding the two articles specifi-
cally mentioned BFOQ as the core legal issue. The affirmative
argument was written by Mary Becker 3 of the 'University of
132. I remember a seminar in law school in which students were assigned the
task of writing in support of, or against, the argument propounded by a scholar in a
law review or other academic journal. About midway through the term we rebelled
against this practice, saying that our reactions to the articles were far more compli-
cated than could be expressed as support or opposition and that, further, asking us to
be "advocates" of theoretical positions without recourse to our own feelings or reac-
tions was unrealistic. I should add that this was a seminar in feminist approaches to
legal theory, and we felt that our reaction to the process reflected a valid critique of
legal thinking and legal method generally. The professor running the seminar entirely
sympathized with our concerns, and permitted us to begin writing rigorous "reactions"
to the pieces that did not necessarily support or refute them.
133. Sex Discrimination: Does Refusing to Hire Men as Food Servers Violate the
Civil Rights Act?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 40 [hereinafter Sex Discrimination]; Mary
Becker, Yes: Discrimination Helps Companies Trade on Women's Sexuality, A-B.A. J.,
Feb. 1996, at 40; Patricia A. Casey, No: A Business Has a Right to Choose Its Own
Character, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 41. I do not discuss the meanings of the titles of the
two position papers because the titles were supplied by the editors of the ABA Journal
without consultation with the authors; consequently, they can be looked at as separa-
ble texts. Having said that, there is still an argument that the titles should be
included in the analysis anyway. First, the reader of the articles would not necessarily
be aware that the titles were supplied, although it is a common editorial practice, and
anyone with experience in writing for newspapers or magazines would be aware of it.
Most readers (even most lawyer-readers) are not in that category, and would think of
the title as part of the piece. Second, regardless of whether the reader actually knows
that the editor supplied the title, nevertheless the title appears, in large, boldface
type, at the top of the article, and it may be the only part of the article many readers
see. While these are compelling arguments, my own awareness of the different source
of the titles makes it difficult for me to think of text and title as an organic whole.
134. Professor Becker's interests in both employment law and feminist jurispru-
dence are longstanding and public. See Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical
Approaches and the Double Bind of Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303 (1993); Mary
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Chicago Law School, while the negative was written by Patri-
cia A. Casey of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, who is
Hooters's attorney135 and presumably had some advisory role
in the planning of the press conference.
A. The Essay by Mary E. Becker
Here is the first paragraph of Becker's article:
In the 1970s, Southwest Airlines dressed its stewardesses
in hot pants and go-go boots, and ran an ad campaign
with the theme, "Fly me." Southwest argued that sex was
the essence of its marketing to male business travelers,
and that its females-only hiring policy was "necessary for
the continued success of its image and its business."
136
The first thing to strike the reader about this paragraph is
that it concerns neither Hooters nor food servers. It is a narra-
tive, telling the story of a series of actions by another company
that apparently occurred twenty years ago. A nonlawyer
reading this passage might wonder what relevance that story
has to this dispute, although there are similarities to the
Hooters scenario.
But this paragraph is written by a lawyer for other lawyers,
who will recognize the intent of the narrative: this is going to
be an argument by analogy, probably an argument from prece-
dent. Even if the particular lawyer-reader is not aware of
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 1 7 she can guess how the ar-
gument will proceed. Probably Becker is going to tell us about
a court decision that found Southwest Airlines to have violated
Title VII, and probably she is going to argue that the Hooters
scenario is similar to the Southwest scenario. This form of
argument is so familiar to lawyers that we intuitively recog-
nize the classic introductions to it and can comfortably guess
at what is coming next. By using this format, Becker places
Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815 (1996); Mary E.
Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Mary Becker,
Reproductive Hazards After Johnson Controls, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 43 (1994).
135. See Sex Discrimination, supra note 133, at 40.
136. Becker, supra note 133, at 40.
137. 517 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Tex. 1981); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying
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herself squarely within the community of lawyers, and informs
us that it is within that community that she intends to make
her case. Moreover, she is saying that this is the sort of contro-
versy that ought to be resolved by those who talk like lawyers,
rather than those who talk like politicians or marketing direc-
tors. Legal reasoning, and especially the ancient common law
tradition of argument from precedent, is a good and proper
way to think.
38
Of course there are many different ways to introduce a con-
trolling precedent. One could simply open by saying, "This case
is squarely controlled by Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.," or
"the facts presented by the Hooters scenario are slightly more
exotic versions of facts presented in earlier cases." I think that
Becker would agree with both of these statements, and both
are consonant with the intent of her article. Why, then, does
she start by telling the story of Southwest's business practices
and its arguments for maintaining them?
I think that this strategy serves two functions. First, by
telling a story, Becker places herself in that class of lawyers
who know that "the life of the law is experience.', 9 The first
thing she knows about Wilson is what events took place, and
why they took place. All lawyers, and especially academic law-
yers, run the risk of giving the impression that they are so
interested in theory that they neglect the mundane facts of life
and the realistic concerns of people, especially people in busi-
ness. We are, indeed, routinely accused of this.4 ' But Becker
knows not only what Southwest did, but why Southwest did it:
she understands the marketing motivation behind the busi-
ness practice. Although she has defined herself as a lawyer
among lawyers, she also shows that she knows what nonlaw-
yers (particularly businesses) do.
Second, this particular story emphasizes the purpose of
Southwest's practices. By the time we finish reading this
paragraph, we understand that Southwest really was trying to
use sex as a marketing strategy, and really did feel that it was
essential to its business. This makes Southwest look a great
deal like Hooters, particularly because of the motivation be-
hind the action. Before we even get to the second paragraph,
138. For a resonant hymn to the complexities of precedent, see WHITE, ACTS OF
HOPE, supra note 49, at 153-83.
139. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
140. See, e.g., PHILIP K HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW Is
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); Schneyer, supra note 28, at 155-57.
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we are probably feeling that these two cases are parallel in
important respects.
Is this a good way to proceed? Any lawyer would try to
stress similarities in helpful precedent, and Becker is putting
those similarities at the front. But is this particular way of
doing it distracting or beguiling? Is Becker camouflaging the
facts that are more difficult to reconcile with Hooters? After
all, there are certainly differences between the airline industry
and the restaurant industry, and between the two marketing
approaches. Is Becker leading us to miss them? I think not; the
fact that Wilson involves stewardesses rather than waitresses,
and the manner of the advertisements, are explicitly discussed
at the very beginning. Far from hiding them, Becker starts
with them.
As anticipated, Becker's second paragraph continues with a
summary of the court's basic holding in Wilson, including the
crucial language that "'sex does not become a bona fide occu-
pational qualification merely because an employer chose to
exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool, or to better
[elnsure profitability.' ,141 She points out that Southwest later
found another marketing device. Then she produces a third
paragraph that is designed to mirror her first one:
Now, a restaurant chain is arguing its business is not food
but the ambiance and entertainment created for men by
Hooters "girls." These women usually wear tight short-
shorts and tank tops or half-tees with a large-eyed owl on
the front; some shirt backs read "More than a mouth-
ful."14
2
The parallel construction here is remarkable. Becker em-
phasizes the similarity in the uniforms ("hot pants" vs. "tight
short-shorts") and marketing strategy ("Fly me" vs. "More than
a mouthful"), as well as the similarity between the arguments
of the companies ("sex was the essence of its marketing to
male business travelers" vs. "business is not food but the am-
biance and entertainment created for men by Hooters 'girls'").
The effect of this well-rendered analogy is to persuade the
reader that the important parts of the cases are identical, and
that the holding in the one should apply to the other. Yet all of
this is accomplished in narrative form, without resort to overt
141. Becker, supra note 133, at 40 (quoting Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303).
142. Becker, supra note 133, at 40.
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logical argument; the story makes the argument all by itself.
This is a powerful rhetorical device, because the reader is led
to believe that his own intelligence is drawing the parallels.
Also, notice the pattern of the paragraphs: facts-law-facts. We
are shown how one set of facts led to a legal conclusion, and
then shown another set of facts that closely resembles it. Our
tendency to form patterns leads us to conclude that a similar
legal conclusion would follow the similar facts. Again, the fact
that we are lawyers is key: Lawyers believe in this common-
law style of reasoning; Becker is fully invested in that style
and thinks that we should be too. Becker's fourth, single-
sentence paragraph fulfills our expectations: she tells us that
to find in favor of Hooters would require us to abandon the le-
gal rule set forth in Wilson.' This is something against which
our common law respect for precedent rebels, and besides, we
are already invested in the rightness of the Wilson decision. "
Becker then switches her focus and begins to talk about
policy-specifically, policy concerning women. She points out
that the defeat of Hooters would mean that some women
might lose their jobs, and that it's even possible that Hooters
would go out of business, hurting more female employees. How,
then, is this good for women? She responds by denying that
Hooters will go out of business, and then identifying three ad-
vantageous characteristics of a changed Hooters following
such a court decision: "reasonable, comfortable uniforms" for
female employees, a reduced frequency and severity of sexual
harassment due to the changed environment, and increased
job security for women who cease to appear sexually attractive
as currently defined by culture.'45 She admits that
in a world without a discriminatory Hooters, women
will not be able to trade their youth, beauty and sex
appeal for a job with good wages and (often) a lot of
sexual harassment. But the woman who does get the
143. See id.
144. At this point it should be noted that Casey's legal assumption about the case
does not match Becker's. Casey believes that finding in favor of Hooters is consistent
with Wilson, because sexuality really is the essence of Hooters's business, while it
wasn't the essence of Southwest's. See Casey, supra note 133, at 41. This distinction is
found nowhere in Becker's piece, and it is clear from the way her article is written
that she doesn't believe in it. See Becker, supra note 133, at 40.
145. See Becker, supra note 133, at 40.
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job will have greater job security, as well as better
working conditions.14
What is interesting about this passage is that the policy is-
sues Becker discusses are the grounds for neither the EEOC
investigation nor the current Latuga litigation, both of which
have focused on discrimination against men. Becker seems to
be saying that discrimination against men is not the real or
important issue-indeed, her article does not mention the in-
terests of male plaintiffs at all. Instead, she is concerned with
the negative effects the Hooters environment has on its female
employees. The environment she speaks of is not the discrimi-
nation in hiring per se, but rather the sexually exploitative
nature of the business. She is saying that a Hooters without
discrimination-by which she apparently means a Hooters
without the "Hooters Girl" concept-will be better for women.
By thus changing her focus, Becker defines herself in two
ways. First, she is interested in policy in general, something
she will reinforce in her last paragraphs, in which she speaks
of the "broad societal" consequences of a victory or defeat for
Hooters. Second, she is interested (and believes that Title VII
should be interested) primarily in the status of women in the
workplace. Her chief concern, which takes up the majority of
the article, is the effect of the case on women. Indeed, the direc-
tion and tone of the article reflect the "dominance" approach,
rather than the "difference" approach, to equality law."'
Within this approach, the plaintiffs are disregarded because
they suffer no real harm; no one really thinks that any specific
men, or men in general, have suffered any genuine loss be-
cause of sex discrimination at Hooters.
The combination of these two definitions is, in one sense,
quite resonant: we want people to think more broadly than the
individual case, and we want them to take into consideration
the interests of those who might be "hurt" by the result. Yet, by
making the question of subjugation, rather than equal treat-
ment, the center of her attention, Becker makes it seem that
Title VII itself, and the way it has been judicially interpreted,
do not matter that much after all. Amazingly, it is not the in-
terests of Hooters that vanish in this article; it is the interests
of the male plaintiffs. The future benefits to female employees
about which Becker speaks so glowingly are, after all, entirely
146. Id.
147. Becker is a proponent of this school of thought. See supra note 134.
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hypothetical. We do not know that Hooters will change its fo-
cus or its policies in response to a loss, other than by hiring
men; presumably it could exploit women just as much and still
satisfy the statute. This aspect of the essay is troubling, be-
cause in losing sight of the actual plaintiffs involved in the
case, Becker falls prey to a criticism routinely made of lawyers,
notably academic lawyers, and especially feminist academic
lawyers: that we are more interested in changing the world to
suit our beliefs than we are in the fate of specific individuals.14
Finally, Becker speculates on the consequences of a win by
Hooters in this case. She returns to her earlier assertion that
finding in favor of Hooters requires abandoning Wilson:
Think of the jobs that could become part of the sex indus-
try were employers simply free to add female sexuality to
any job description: all customer-contact jobs in transpor-
tation, restaurants, sales, marketing, service industries,
etc.
What would be the result of a Hooters victory if other em-
ployers followed the lead? Those in so-called women's jobs
would have little job security and be subject to higher lev-
els of harassment. I suspect women might earn even less
per hour than they do today.149
Now the stakes are higher. Earlier, she was concerned with
the effects on workers at Hooters itself; now, she is talking
about the future of women in the American workplace. Previ-
ously we might have thought that following the Wilson logic
was simply a matter of respect for precedent. Now, though, it
148. See Cahill, supra note 39, at 1145-47; see also supra note 140 and accompa-
nying text. You will note that I use the word "we" to refer to feminist academic
lawyers, overtly including myself in that group. By doing this I remind you of my bi-
ases, and simultaneously try to form a community including both myself and Becker.
Do I also create the impression that you, the reader, ought to include yourself in this
community of feminists?
It might be argued that Becker's position does take the fate of specific people into
account-notably the specific women who work at Hooters now and are the victims of
this exploitation. Yet how can one make this argument without dismissing the appar-
ently subjective views of the servers themselves as "false consciousness"? See Rhee,
supra note 4, at 185-87.
149. Becker, supra note 133, at 40. In this context, however, it is important to note
that servers at Hooters apparently earn considerably more in tips than their counter-
parts at other restaurants. See Rhee, supra note 4, at 186-87; Joe Sonneman, Letter
to the Editor, Hooters' Real Bias Is Against Some of Its Patrons, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1,
1996, at A18; Stetler, supra note 55.
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seems that abandoning Wilson would be more than rejecting a
precedent; it would be opening the floodgates for sex-specific
jobs, all of which would be degrading and oppressive to the
women who would be called upon to fill them. Becker now de-
fines Wilson as the finger in the dike holding those waters
back. Hooters itself, and even the future of women workers at
Hooters, now shrink into insignificance. We are talking about
the very nature of sexual equality, about whether we will turn
back the clock on the cultural meaning of Title VII itself.
But this begins to seem overwrought. Becker's prediction
reads like a dissenting opinion in an appellate court decision:
these are the dire consequences of the court's decision today.5 °
While some dissenting opinions turn out to be prescient, 51
most are exaggerating in order to make a point. Further, this
tactic by dissenting judges never seems entirely trustworthy;
either they are being careless in the way they calculate future
outcomes, or they are evidencing a reckless disregard for the
truth. Why should we believe that Becker is right about the
consequences of abandoning the logic of Wilson?
But perhaps I demand too much of a text. Becker, like me, is
a professor who is used to putting careful, detailed arguments
into lengthy, excruciating articles. A 500-word essay is an en-
tirely different matter, in which a detailed argument cannot be
made. It is difficult to be persuaded by the logic of a 500-word
essay, because the author does not have the space in which to
show all the steps in the proof. Such a short piece must suc-
ceed based as much on its ethos and pathos as on its logos;
claims of authority and tugs at the heartstrings are part of the
whole. Yet, at the same time, what a writer chooses to omit
from such an essay is a valid criterion for evaluating the ethos
she creates.
Becker's rhetoric is admirable, in my view, because of
reliance on a shared history with its audience, its implied
belief that legal culture and legal tradition can and should
protect the rights of the oppressed.'52 She shows herself to be
150. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 US. 502, 525-43 (1993) (Souter,
J., dissenting); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-71
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
151. The two that spring immediately to mind are Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 65-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US. 537, 552-64
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152. I am aware of the dangers of this particular kind of rhetoric. It is "liberal," in
the sense that it treats the procedures of contemporary legal culture, which have been
designed by, and serve to perpetuate, the existing power structure as fit devices for
undermining, humanizing, or leveling that structure. Such a set of assumptions has
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(and insists that her readers should be) concerned with overall
justice rather than with the needs of the moment. However,
she fails to acknowledge the validity of the concerns of Hooters
and she distances herself too much from the actual or
potential litigants. She sounds, indeed, like a professor: talking
about the best aspirations of the legal system and its effect on
overall population, but not overly concerned with the actual
individuals involved in particular disputes.
B. The Essay by Patricia A. Casey
Here is the first, single-sentence paragraph of Casey's article:
The EEOC's charge of sex discrimination against Hooters
restaurants invites observers to muddle the legal and po-
litical issues.""
This sentence accomplishes many things. First, it makes an
implied claim (never expressly argued in the article) that there
is a distinction between legal and political issues. Second, it
defines Casey as someone who knows the difference between
them and can explain it to others. Third, it implies that this
distinction is an important one about which the reader should
be concerned. Fourth, it defines the EEOC as someone who
does not understand, is not concerned with, or refuses to be
forthright about that distinction. Fifth, it defines the reader as
someone who, because of the EEOC's actions, is either already
confused, or is in serious danger of becoming confused, about
that distinction-in other words, someone who needs instruc-
tion by Casey.
been sharply criticized by an entire generation of legal scholars. See MARK KELLMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3-4 (1987); Kennedy, supra note 105. Neverthe-
less, Becker's article is addressed to the members of the American Bar Association, an
organization made up of people firmly entrenched in the legal culture. When ad-
dressing such a group, the writer has a choice. On the one hand, she can point out the
inherent flaws and contradictions in the audience's underlying culture, in the hopes
that audience will abandon aspects of that culture in favor of something better. James
Boyd White has written an entire book describing superb canonical examples of just
such a strategy. See WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE, supra note 49. On the other hand,
the writer can attempt to teach her readers that they can, and should, use the power
given to them by their culture to help others. If the members of the culture come to
believe that it is supposed to serve these functions, that may serve as a marginal al-
teration of the culture itself.
153. Casey, supra note 133, at 41.
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She has also altered the terms of the discussion: we are not
really talking about whether what Hooters did violated the
law, nor whether "refusing to hire men as food servers vio-
late[s] the Civil Rights Act""5 (the question posed by the ABA
Journal), but whether legal and political issues have been con-
fused. This would be a very different sort of debate, concerned
less with the interpretation of the law and more with the na-
ture of thought and argument itself and the character of those
involved in the debate. In other words, Casey has turned the
focus away from Hooters and towards those talking about
Hooters: herself, Becker, the EEOC, and, of course, us.
Casey's second paragraph is a mixture of law, opinion, and
innuendo:
Under the law, an employer may hire on the basis of gen-
der (or national origin or religion, but never race) if sex "is
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business."
For Hooters, the real issue turns on statutory construction
and common sense: Do you have to be female to perform
the job of a Hooters girl? I say yes. Politically incorrect it
may be, but unlawful it is not.15
This is a remarkable construction. The first sentence is a
precisely correct recital of the rule, indeed resorting to the ac-
tual wording of the statute. This is powerful because it
appears to promise that Casey's argument is going to be based
on the wording of the law itself-she is going to draw her
authority from the legislature's own words and her own ability
to interpret. If, as she has suggested, the debate is really about
the distinction between -law and politics, she is going to show
that she understands the legal side very well.
But take a closer look: this formulation is actually too
complete. Why does she bother with the parenthetical
explanation of the different characteristics that may be the
basis of a BFOQ? More importantly, why does she bother to
remind us that race is never the basis of a BFOQ? Hooters's
press kit included the same explanation, including two
separate references to the fact that race cannot be a BFOQ. 56
This is interesting, since apparently no one has argued that
154. Sex Discrimination, supra note 133, at 40.
155. Casey, supra note 133, at 41.
156. See PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
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race (or religion or national origin) has anything to do with
this case. The mention of race serves to remind us that Title
VII, by its own terms, appears to find something particularly
heinous about race discrimination. This is important because
it gives the appearance of reducing the importance of sex
discrimination: if Congress would allow BFOQs for sex but not
for race, sex discrimination must not be as bad as race
discrimination. The implication is that even if Hooters has
committed sex discrimination, that's not such a terrible thing.'57
The second sentence of this paragraph alters the focus
slightly: now that we know the law, we have to interpret it.
But statutory construction by itself, apparently, is not suffi-
cient; in addition we must use something called "common
sense." This is an odd thing for a lawyer to say to other law-
yers. How is common sense separate from statutory con-
struction? Surely common sense is one of the many tools nor-
mally used in construing statutes.'58 Casey, however, implies
that some people (the EEOC, for example) fail to use common
sense in statutory construction. But more than this, by con-
joining these two words with the word "and," she implies that
common sense has a separate status that may be of equal
standing with that of statutory construction. There are, in
other words, non-lawyerly skills that are necessary to arrive at
the right outcome. If lawyers have lost the habit of using com-
mon sense, as she implies, then we may be less qualified than
the ordinary person to interpret the meaning of the law. For-
tunately we have Casey, who knows what common sense is
and how to use it.
159
In asking whether "you have to be female to perform the job
of a Hooters girl," Casey subsumes an important point in her
157. Such a sentiment would correspond to the historical development of cultural
consciousness about discrimination in this country. See supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text.
158. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the rules of statutory inter-
pretation are many and mutually contradictory. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on
the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to
Be Interpreted, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). Thus, the rule "Words are to be
taken in their ordinary meaning unless they are technical terms or words of art," id.
at 404, which corresponds to the statement in the text accompanying this footnote, is
countered with the rule, "Popular words may bear a technical meaning and technical
words may have a popular signification and they should be so construed as to agree
with evident intention or to make the statute operative," id., which may belie the use
of common sense in this context.
159. Not coincidentally, the documents in the Hooters press kit also make re-
peated references to "common sense" as the determining factor; they say that "[t]he
issue isn't sex discrimination. It's common sense." PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
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construction. We know that since Johnson Controls BFOQs
must be specifically linked to the employee's ability to do the
job;'" by defining the job as "the job of a Hooters girl," Casey
takes the company's marketing strategy as part of the defini-
tion of the position. One does not find "Hooters girl" among the
occupational categories listed in the Department of Labor in-
dexes, nor in the classifications made by newspapers or
employment agencies. Those entities would probably have de-
fined the position as "waitron," "server," "bartender," or "maitre
d'hotel." The way she asks the question imposes the answer.
Her response-"I say yes"-has a simple power just because of
her clear reliance on her own judgment. It sounds very much
like the sort of thing a person relying on "common sense" would
say. Further, it sounds more like the beginning of a political
speech than like a legal argument, participating in the confu-
sion Casey identifies between law and politics in this case.
The paragraph's final sentence, though, is a loaded weapon.
In the last decade or so, the words "politically correct" have
been used almost exclusively by those who wish to deride the
thing they describe. Practically no one uses the term to de-
scribe himself. People have built entire careers out of using the
words "political correctness" to flagellate their colleagues, their
political opponents, or anyone else with sympathies leaning to
the political left. 6' In popular usage, this term has come to de-
note the rigid adherence to a dogmatic code of conduct in
speech and thought, mandated by the hypersensitivity of all
those who might conceivably benefit from Title VII or other
antidiscrimination statutes.'62 "Political correctness" is rou-
tinely compared to Nazi book-burnings, Soviet intellectual
dogmatism, and the red-baiting of the McCarthy era. To call
an idea "politically correct," therefore, is to call it narrow,
mindless, and intolerant. By contrast, by saying that her own
answer about Hooters-which she has not yet explained or de-
fended-may be politically incorrect, Casey has already
defined herself (I am not bound by dogmatism or silly conven-
tions) and her opponents (anyone who disagrees with me is
160. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991).
161. Dinesh D'Souza springs to mind as one whose career has been so enhanced.
See DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMPUS (1991). D'Souza and Stanley Fish actually engaged in a series of touring de-
bates on the subject. See Geoffrey W. Castello, Almost a Pragmatist, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 967, 968-69 (1996) (reviewing STANLEY FISH, PROFESSIONAL CORRECTNESS:
LITERARY STUDIES AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1995)).
162. See, e.g., D'SOUZA, supra note 161.
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like a Nazi or a McCarthyite). Further, she has revived the dis-
tinction between law and politics in a more sinister way.
Earlier, when she said that one risked muddling legal and po-
litical issues, we might have believed that the "politics" she
was describing was the politics of honest people of goodwill
disagreeing about matters of principle. Now, however, we see
that she means the politics of the crazy left as opposed to the
rest of America, including herself in the latter. The "politically
correct," she is telling us, are at odds with the law.
It is not until the third paragraph that Casey's actual ar-
gument begins. The core of this argument is an idea of
considerable legal and intellectual merit, namely that a busi-
ness does not have a single and exclusive "core" essence but is
more complicated. Consequently, to say that the "food" aspect
is more important than the "sex" aspect of Hooters, and there-
fore is the primary relevant determinant of what constitutes
the "job" of a server at Hooters, is to greatly oversimplify an
intricate problem. She compares Hooters to Playboy magazine
and the Rockettes dancers: in each case there is a non-sexual
aspect to the business which might conceivably be called pri-
mary or essential, but Casey implies that focusing exclusively
on such an aspect at the expense of the obvious sexual intent
of the enterprise would be ludicrous.
More than this, she argues that this is really a dispute over
who should be entitled to define the essence or defining char-
acteristic of a business. To Casey the answer is obvious: "Don't
these businesses have the right to decide exactly what prod-
ucts to offer on the market?"1" While at some points she
suggests that the question is so amorphous that no one knows
what the essence of the business actually is, she wants there
to be deference to businesses. It will be noted that such a rule,
if taken literally, would have an odd effect in discrimination
cases: if any business has the right to define what its primary,
essential aspects are simply by saying so, and if government
regulators and courts ought to defer to that determination,
then businesses can create BFOQs at their convenience when-
ever faced with a lawsuit. This position taken by Casey
actually lends credence to Becker's earlier warning (which had
seemed so overwrought) that the wrong decision in this case
could create an army of new, artificial BFOQs.
Casey's argument concerning the authority to speak about
the essence of a business has another agenda, however: to
163. Casey, supra note 133, at 41.
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discredit the opinions of the EEOC. Consider the following
chain of statements about the agency:
The EEOC seems to believe that a business can have only
one defining characteristic, or "essence." ... And who is
the EEOC to say that only one of the many elements of
Hooters is the essential, defining one?
Hooters' case demonstrates the limitations of the EEOC's
expertise-quite simply, the agency lacks the business
acumen necessary to determine what elements are
"essential" to an enterprise. Indeed, it currently is making
a similar mistake in a case against the Lillie Rubin
clothing stores, in which it is asking the women's store to
hire men as well as women to assist patrons in the
dressing rooms. (According to an EEOC spokesperson,
women might "love" to be fitted by male attendants.)1 6
In this string of quotations I have omitted the details of Ca-
sey's legal argument in order to highlight the non-legal,
rhetorical position she is staking out. She is arguing not
merely that the EEOC has reached the wrong result, but that
it has no business arriving at any result, because it is not
competent to judge what is "reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business."16 What constitutes
the normal operation of the business is a business decision,
and isolated ("politically correct"?) government bureaucrats
are in no position to second-guess those decisions. Worse, these
bureaucrats are so separated from the rest of "us" that they
have lost any ability to use "common sense."
The Lillie Rubin anecdote, and especially the isolated, par-
enthetical, decontextualized quotation from an anonymous
"spokesperson," are designed to show that the judgments of
the EEOC are untrustworthy because they do not reflect what
ordinary people would recognize from ordinary experience."
164. Id.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
166. This particular criticism of government regulators is becoming increasingly
popular. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 140. Aside from whatever basis this criticism
may have in fact, it may be a symptom of the increasing feeling of remoteness that
many people associate with government in general and the federal government in
particular.
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Of course the Lillie Rubin and Hooters scenarios are not par-
allel. If the EEOC has made a mistake with Lillie Rubin, it is a
mistake that relates to understanding the needs of gender-
related privacy. This mistake, though arguably more funda-
mental, is of a different character than misapprehending the
essential nature of Hooters's business. In this sense, using the
EEOC's judgment in the Lillie Rubin case as a way of discred-
iting its judgment in Hooters is not entirely honest. Yet it
permits her to create a general picture of the EEOC that is
helpful to her position: she defines the agency as unrealistic,
pig-headed, isolated, inexperienced, and fundamentally stupid.
Add to this the implied charge that the EEOC is "politically
correct" (dogmatic, narrow, fanatical), and the reader wants to
conclude that its judgments are worthless.
This is, perhaps, the sort of picture a contemporary poli-
tician might paint of an opponent in a campaign speech; in
fact, it closely resembles the pictures several politicians have
recently painted of several government agencies.'67 It is also
the sort of picture a litigator might paint of an opposing
party or an unfriendly witness in a closing argument to the
jury.168 Is this a legitimate way of talking, though? Does it
foster the kind of thinking we would like to have or the kind
of community we would like to create? I am inclined to be
skeptical of this use of language. Casey is writing about a
difficult and subtle point in discrimination law that can have
tremendous consequences for the employer, the employees,
and potential applicants. She is describing the agency
charged with enforcing discrimination law, whose supposed
argument, though possibly incorrect, would certainly be
legitimate and well-taken. The logic of her own substantive
argument shows that a sense of the complicated and the
ambiguous is absolutely necessary to sort out this dispute,
which belies her earlier assertion that "common sense" is at
the core of the problem. Yet she treats the EEOC as if it were
missing the obvious and the simple, as though this really is a
matter of common sense. In Casey's version of the story, the
agency and its lawyers are not intelligent minds who are to
be taken seriously. This conversation is not designed to be a
167. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S5534-01 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchison); 141
CONG. REC. E285-04 (1995) (statement of Sen. Cunningham).
168. I have commented elsewhere on the difficult rhetorical position of the litiga-
tor and the pitfalls of misleading language. See Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal
Pronoun, supra note 49, at 1345-46.
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dialogue, or, if it is, the EEOC is not going to be the one with
whom Casey speaks.169
Also, what does it mean to say that an issue depends on
"common sense," while demonstrating that it actually depends
on a subtle understanding of the shifting definitions of the
identity or essence of an enterprise? On the one hand, declar-
ing that one is going to use common sense begins to build a
community with the reader, because the reader, who imagines
that he has common sense, feels that he will be participating
in the problem-solving that is about to begin. On the other
hand, if common sense is what's needed, which all of us (except
perhaps the EEOC) have, then why do we need Casey to ex-
plain the matter to us? Does she have more common sense
than we do? Of course, she does not really believe in the use of
pure common sense here, and her reasoning is, as I have said,
rather subtle and, in places, elegant. The device of claiming
the mantle of common sense while engaging in subtle analysis
has the effect of causing the reader to believe that Casey's dif-
ficult conclusions are not difficult at all. It is, at least to that
extent, dishonest.
Casey's last paragraph changes the subject, and contains
her only mention of the Wilson precedent:
And don't tell me about flight attendants unless you are
prepared to argue that sexiness is just as important as
safe and timely travel to your next business trip. Hooters
can argue that its patrons care as much-or more-about
being in the presence of the Hooters girls as they do about
the burgers and beer.7'
The difficulty with this argument is that Southwest Airlines
presumably could have made, and apparently did make, the
same case for its passengers. One has only to harken back to
1960s jokes about stewardesses (most of them explicitly using
the "Fly Me" slogan) to postulate that male business travelers
selected Southwest in those days specifically because of the
sex appeal of the flight attendants. The argument is mislead-
ing in another way: by comparing sexiness to safety, Casey
presents the illusion of an unanswerable argument. Of course,
169. Elsewhere I have criticized judges for engaging in the same sort of implied
annihilation of the intelligence of the other. For me, this particular sort of rhetoric is
always bad, because it forecloses the possibility of productive conversation between
two or more independent minds. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 142-44.
170. Casey, supra note 133, at 41.
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no one would knowingly fly on an unsafe airline just to see at-
tractive flight personnel. But it is equally true that no one
would eat in an unsafe restaurant (with food of questionable
wholesomeness, or where gang wars were known to erupt) just
to see attractive servers. But safety was never the issue with
Southwest, just as it is not with Hooters: neither business
marketed itself as especially safe.
The syntax of this paragraph is also worth comment. For
one thing, it is flip: "And don't tell me about flight attendants
... ." The tone of the sentence suggests that flight attendants
are just an annoying afterthought that no reasonable person
would discuss. Yet flight attendants involve the most impor-
tant court precedent for this case: their jobs have many similar
functions to those of servers, and they too have been used as
deliberate sexual objects by their employers. The cases seem to
be very close. This, too, is less than a perfectly forthright form
of argument: Casey takes the precedential argument that is
most harmful to her case and treats it as though it is not even
worth considering. This form of argument would not be useful
to her if she were writing to a judge who was familiar with the
precedent: then she would have to argue about Wilson seri-
ously. This passage, then, is aimed at a comparatively ignorant
audience-yet this is the very audience whose "common sense"
Casey praises elsewhere.
Further, the form of this sentence-do not discuss X unless
you are first willing to say Y-imposes an artificial limitation
on debate. It cuts off the speech of the other-whether that
other be Becker, the EEOC, or the reader. The imposition of
silence is another example of what I would call "bad rhetoric,"
especially in the context of a point that is being blithely tossed
off as an afterthought. Casey does not want to engage in a dis-
cussion of this issue in its full complexity, even as she
demonstrates the skill with which she can handle complex is-
sues. Dialectic-that is, the give-and-take of minds involved in
honest disagreement-is not valued in this world. And if the
reader is not supposed to speak, and is supposed to use
"common sense" only to the extent and only in the precise way
that Casey wants, what is the role of the reader here? Not,
surely, an "end in herself." We, like the EEOC, are means to
Casey's end. This lawyer is a litigator, and winning is what
counts.
The Becker and Casey essays, then, provide us with two differ-
ent ways in which lawyers might talk about sex discrimination.
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Becker's presentation is that of a professor; Casey's is that of a
litigator. Becker bases her position on argument from analogy
and common law reasoning, while Casey (who also uses argu-
ment by analogy) bases her position on common sense and a
political notion of the proper way to make decisions about busi-
ness. Becker's position is rooted in public policy, but it is the
public policy designed to help women, the traditional victims
of sex discrimination, rather than the men who are supposedly
the victims here. Casey's position is rooted in the notion of
competence and a belief that government agencies are not
competent. It is also based on a skepticism of left-leaning, aca-
demic thought (such as Becker's). It does not concern itself
with the interests of women, nor with those of men who are
the victims of discrimination, but rather with the economic ef-
ficiency of business. Finally, while Becker's argument invites
the reader to engage in the same sort of analysis from prece-
dent that she does, Casey's seems to demand a sort of
unconditional acceptance.'
171. For the last three years, the AB.A Journal has printed photographs of the
authors of its "At Issue" columns along with the text of the articles. Consequently,
while drafting this section I had the faces of Mary Becker and Patricia Casey smiling
at me as I wrote. Did that make a difference?
An illustration by John Schmelzer accompanies these two articles. See Sex Dis-
crimination, supra note 133, at 41. In the illustration, an artist at a drawing board
(presumably Schmelzer himself) is attempting to sketch two different pictures of res-
taurants, one called "Classic" and the other apparently called 'Nouveau." The
"Classic" picture shows a scene that seemingly represents Hooters as it is now, with
young women in shorts and tank tops carrying trays; a picture of a "Hooters Girl,"
which the artist has evidently used as a model for the waitresses, is pinned up on the
wall next to him. The "Nouveau" picture shows young men waiters in shorts and tee
shirts with the words "Nouveau" printed on them, and one more traditional, over-
weight male bartender. However, in a style reminiscent of M.C. Escher's Reptiles
(1943) or Drawing Hands (1948), the figures in the sketches are refusing to stay there.
They emerge from the pictures to engage in fierce, finger-pointing, fist-shaking argu-
ments with each other and with the artist himself, who has stopped drawing in
dismay. Two of the figures have obtained erasers with which they are purposefully
approaching the drawing board. This illustration demonstrates the potential for con-
stitutive rhetoric in nonverbal representations. How is Schmelzer defining himself?
How is he defining the controversy and the people in it? What does he expect of his
viewer? What are his notions of right and wrong in this context? For the Escher
drawings mentioned, see M.C. ESCHER, THE GRAPHIC WORK OF M.C ESCHER plates 28,
69 (1967).
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VII. PEOPLE TALKING:
EDITORIALS IN THE POPULAR PRESS
Lawsuits and other legal disputes generate waves and rip-
ples in their communities. Journalists, commentators, novelists,
dramatists, and poets create rich bodies of literature inspired
by famous trials. This literature creates a textual community
of its own, distinct from (but interactive with) the rhetorical
constitution of the lawyers, judges, and parties themselves. As
noted above, there is an entire field of scholarship devoted to
examining the way law and legal disputes are represented in
literature and popular culture. 172 Ed Cohen has ably demon-
strated how the journalistic accounts of a trial can completely
alter the nature of the dispute and the community's relation-
ship to it.' Even without this scholarship, a cursory obser-
vation of the texts concerning the recent trials of O.J. Simpson
would convince any of us that the justice system and the me-
dia exist in close symbiosis. 74
The many editorials written in the month following Hoot-
ers's press release show a remarkable variation in style,
sophistication, and insight. Some analyze the issue in great
detail, some joke in single-sentence bullets, some engage in
extended displays of irony.'75 Among so many, the choice of any
172. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
173. See Ed Cohen, lyping Wilde: Construing the "Desire to Appear to Be a Person
Inclined to the Commission of the Gravest of All Offenses," 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1
(1993).
174. 0. J. Simpson, a well-known athlete and actor, was tried for the murder of his
ex-wife and her friend in 1995. The trial, which lasted for many months and ended in
Simpson's acquittal, received constant and intense attention from the media, espe-
cially television. The many discourses created around this event involved the value of
criminal trial procedure, the place of race in American culture, the interaction be-
tween racial identity and factfinding, the concept of credibility and truth, and, of
course, practically endless scrutiny of the role of the media itself.
175. In a resonant passage from C.S. Lewis, an in-house writer has been assigned
the task of manufacturing editorials commenting on events taking place at his own
place of business. See C.S. LEWIS, THAT HIDEOUS STRENGTH 146 (1946). One, destined
"for one of the most respectable of our papers," begins this way: "While it would be
premature to make any final comment on last night's riot at Edgestow, two conclu-
sions seem to emerge from the first accounts (which we publish elsewhere) with a
clarity which is not likely to be shaken by subsequent developments." Id. The second,
written "for a more popular organ," id., begins: "What is happening at Edgestow? That
is the question which John Citizen wants to have answered. The Institute which has
settled at Edgestow is a National Institute. That means it is yours and mine." Id. at
148. In Lewis's work, the complacency with which the writer manufactures these two
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single editorial upon which to comment is nearly random. One
could find meaningful and interesting things to say about al-
most all of them. I have selected, therefore, two which seem to
me to have been written by especially talented commentators,
appearing in influential publications or venues, and on oppo-
site sides of the question.
A. The Editorial by James Bovard
One of the most influential editorials appeared in the Wall
Street Journal on November 17, 1995, two days after the Hoot-
ers press conference.'76 The Journal's actual news coverage of
the press conference, printed November 16, was essentially
nonexistent; it consisted of a three-sentence summary on page
twenty.17  Consequently, the 1,000 word editorial by James
Bovard contained the only detailed information the newspa-
per's readers received about the dispute between the EEOC
and Hooters. This editorial was widely read and widely com-
mented on; it resulted in an apparent flood of mail.'78
Bovard is a well-known journalist and commentator who
has written several books, all of them highly critical of the fed-
eral government.7 7 His work generally reflects a distaste for
regulation, protectionism, and most other government action
that impacts on the free market or the internal workings of
business."s It is not surprising, therefore, that he disagrees
with the EEOC's position. How he goes about telling us this,
however, is surprising.
different articles is taken as a sign of how far he has been corrupted and how badly he
needs reclamation.
176. James Bovard, The EEOC's War on Hooters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1995, at
A18.
177. Hooters Won't Hire Men, WALLST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at A20.
178. See Letters to the Editor: Hootin' and Hollerin' Over Hooters, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 1995, at A21. Several of my students in the Winter 1995-96 term independ-
ently decided to write papers based on the Hooters discrimination scenario; in all
cases they had been motivated by reading the Bovard editorial.
179. See JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991); JAMES BOVARD, THE FARM
FIASCO (1989); JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY
(1994) [hereinafter BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS]; JAMES BOVARD, SHAKEDOWN: HOW THE
GOVERNMENT SCREWS You FROM A TO Z (1995).
180. He is not, for example, especially fond of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938. See BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS, supra note 179, at 91-96 (describing supposed effects
of the Fair Labor Standards Act in a section entitled "Destroying Jobs In Order to
Achieve Fair Labor").
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Here is the opening of Bovard's editorial:
"Hi there. My name is Bruce and I'll be your Hooters Girl
tonight." This could be the script for the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's latest civil rights triumph.
The EEOC is on the verge of destroying the persona of
one of America's fastest-growing restaurant chains. It is
demanding that Hooters restaurants-home of the notori-
ous "Hooters Girls"-impose a hiring quota, guaranteeing
that at least 40% of all the servers, bartenders and hosts
hired are male. The EEOC claims that Hooters owes at
least $22 million in back pay to guys who never even
worked at its restaurants. And it also is demanding that
the restaurant chain revise the concept of Hooters and
make it gender-neutral.
181
The opening paragraph is satirical, reminiscent of the Hoot-
ers advertisement discussed earlier; indeed, the Wall Street
Journal page containing the editorial also contains a small
copy of the photograph that is so central to the advertise-
ment.182 We are asked, again, to imagine that the EEOC's
position results in an absurd picture, the male "Hooters Girl."
Further, as in the advertisement, there are cues implying a
threat to male sexuality: the juxtaposition of a male name and
the term "Hooters Girl" creates the same tension.'8 By calling
this a "civil rights triumph," Bovard implies that the goal of
the EEOC is to create exactly this sort of environment, in
which sexualized gender roles are confused or reversed.
The second paragraph purports to be a summary of the
EEOC's proposals concerning Hooters, beginning with a sen-
tence using the interesting phrase, "destroying the persona."
Despite its awkwardness (it would have been easier simply to
say that the EEOC is about to destroy the restaurant chain
itself) the phrase has a special impact. "Persona" refers to
something beyond the mere economic success of the business:
A persona is an identity, perhaps a soul; it is something
181. Bovard, supra note 176, at A18.
182. See id.; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
183. For obscure reasons, the name "Bruce" has been associated with male homo-
sexuality for several decades. I have been unable to find scholarly analysis of this
phenomenon, but I think that it is so pervasive as to warrant 'judicial notice." See,
e.g., Metro Desk-The State, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1989, at 2 ("a man named Bruce, who
was probably 'a limp-wristed queer' or 'faggot'").
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intimate and, well, personal. 8' Its destruction seems like a
more complete and spiritual sort of loss than the loss of reve-
nue. Further, destroying a persona is clearly something we
would not want a government to do: it represents government
interference with the individual on a fundamental level.
The second paragraph also contains a number of cues or
signals defining the tone, ethos, and politics of Bovard's voice.
The term "hiring quota," for example, is this decade's code for
government unfairness and left-wing radicalism; it is used by
conservatives (as the term "political correctness" is used) as a
way of characterizing their political opponents. This quota is to
be "imposed," implying interference, hostility, and tyranny. The
phrase, "guys who never even worked at its restaurants"
serves a double purpose: First, the deliberate informality of
the words "guys" and "even" cues the reader to imagine that
the common people are on Hooters's side. Second, this phras-
ing gives a sharper impression of the unfairness of the
demand: someone will be receiving something for nothing. The
word "demanding," used twice in this short paragraph, casts
the EEOC as being unwilling to compromise or negotiate in
good faith; reasonable people don't make demands. This is at
least an exaggeration, since a conciliation offer is, at most, a
bargaining position rather than a demand.
The bulk of Bovard's editorial, taking up thirteen of its
seventeen paragraphs, is devoted to a narrative of the
investigation and negotiation process between the EEOC and
Hooters. The use of narrative gives the editorial (like the
Hooters press release) the feeling of reportage rather than
opinion. When I tell a story, naturally I give my own slant on
it, but the act of saying "this came before that" may lead you to
believe that I am giving you the unvarnished truth.'
Similarly, Bovard is telling a story which has the earmarks of
a simple recitation of facts, although it is located in the
editorial section of the newspaper, is framed on both ends by
his opinions, and (as shall be seen) involves an unbalanced
view of the facts. It allows him to present himself as someone
who is telling us what happened, rather than trying to
convince us of something-indeed, it contains the implied
message that we can be convinced simply by being told what
184. This is an interesting rhetorical device, since a corporation is not a human
being and has neither intimacy nor soul. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 141 n.80.
185. Consider the first sentence of the paragraph containing this footnote, in
which I purport to tell you how much of the editorial is devoted to narrative; it looks
like a simple statement of objective fact-but is it?
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happened. This is a tempting message, because it is based on
the emotionally appealing notion that there are perceptions
about the world that we all share, so that given the same
information we would all respond in the same way. Bovard
places himself and the reader in a community that is so
unified that the mere telling of a story leads them to the same
conclusions-what a satisfying destruction of boundaries! 86 He
places the EEOC squarely outside this community.
One of the interesting aspects of Bovard's narrative is the
amount of detailed, apparently inside information that it in-
cludes. There are details-specifics of Patricia Casey's
negotiations with the EEOC, names of officials involved in the
investigation, quotations from the conciliation offer-which do
not appear in any of the documents released by Hooters or the
EEOC, and which cannot be found anywhere else in the news
reports or editorials written on this subject (except in those
articles that explicitly refer to Bovard as their source). I infer
that Bovard interviewed someone inside Hooters (possibly Ca-
sey, whom he quotes directly) and received access to negotiation
documents or at least some detailed summaries of their con-
tents. This gives him yet another mark of authenticity and
believability: he knows things that the rest of us do not know.
By reading Bovard's piece, I learned things that I did not find
anywhere else, because nowhere else did I have access to the
information. Because of the respect we tend to give to the
opinions of experts and others who have superior information,
it is only natural that we want to believe Bovard. Yet nowhere
does he tell us how he came to know so much, nor does he
point to documents we could review in order to come to our
own conclusions-although we can infer, from other comments
he makes, that he has conducted phone interviews. As sug-
gested above, such a voice does not invite the reader to have an
independent, intelligent mind; we are not given the opportu-
nity to reach conclusions different from Bovard's.
186. The wish for the destruction of boundaries between people is known to be a
deeply felt, and perhaps universal, human desire-although it has been frequently
seen as essentially infantile. See generally HARRIET GOLDHOR LERNER, THE DANCE OF
ANGER (1985); M. SCOTr PECK, THE ROAD LESS TRAVELLED (1978); DAVID SCHNARCH,
PASSIONATE MARRIAGE (1997). This is not the same sort of thing, however, as the
somewhat similar device used by Mary Becker in her essay. In Becker's piece, the use
of the storytelling form invoked a community that was already shared by the readers,
namely the community of lawyers familiar with the notion of argument from prece-
dent. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. It is the difference between
showing someone a form of argument he recognizes and telling someone that no ar-
gument is really necessary.
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Here is the first paragraph of this long narrative:
The EEOC's anti-Hooters vendetta began not in response
to any complaint from a disgruntled male job applicant
but solely to an Oct. 22, 1991, charge by EEOC Commis-
sioner Ricky Silberman. EEOC regulations allow any
commissioner to accuse any company of discrimination,
after which EEOC investigators seek supporting evidence.
Ms. Silberman, now the executive director of the Congres-
sional Office of Compliance, did not return repeated
phone calls seeking comment.
187
At the outset, we are told that this was not a real investiga-
tion or law enforcement operation, but a vendetta-that is, a
private war or feud. Before we learn what the EEOC actually
did, or how it went about it, we are told that its action was a
grudge against Hooters rather than anything legitimate. Also,
notice that the word "vendetta" is so placed as to avoid the ne-
cessity of proving that there was a vendetta; in order to get to
the verb and object of the sentence, the reader assumes that
the vendetta exists. In evidentiary terms, the sentence
"assumes facts not in evidence."' Further, this paragraph tells
us that the entire project was internal to the EEOC, initiated
by an accusation by a commissioner of the agency (no reasons
are suggested for why Silberman might have made such a
charge) who essentially ordered investigators to go out and
seek evidence supporting the accusation. In this text the entire
process seems fundamentally unfair: law enforcement officers
are supposed to investigate and then accuse, not the other way
around. The process, as Bovard describes it, sounds like that of
the Inquisition or the Star Chamber.
Also note how the entire matter is made personal: it was the
grudge of one particular person, Ricky Silberman, that started
all this. By then telling us that Silberman has left the EEOC
and that she has not returned his phone calls, Bovard makes it
appear that she started the fire and then ran away to let it
burn without her; he paints her as both vindictive and irre-
sponsible. She also appears cowardly, as the line about the
phone calls implies that she fears to face the light of public
187. Bovard, supra note 176, at A18.
188. James Boyd White has shown how the opening sentence of the Declaration of
Independence performs a similar function, by causing the reader to unwittingly as-
sent to major assumptions within it. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE, supra note 49, at
233.
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criticism.'8 9 Near the end of the article, Bovard quotes an un-
named "former high-ranking EEOC official" as saying, "'The
women attorneys [at the EEOC] are hot to do this case be-
cause they want to bust up a sexist restaurant chain. They...
want to get at this wicked institution.'""8 Bovard also com-
pares the EEOC action to "the way temperance movement
sisters wielded their axes a hundred years before."' The
anonymous testimony, the picture of the temperance sisters,
and the image of the vindictive Silberman at the beginning of
the editorial create a picture of crazed, fanatical women, de-
void of common sense, abusing the law to get their way. The
word "hot" suggests a sexual passion behind the fanaticism.
Interestingly, then, part of this editorial's power rests on its
caricature of the motives, abilities, and rationality of women
professionals."'
The next two paragraphs of the narrative describe the ar-
guments Hooters made, early in the investigation process, to
dissuade the EEOC:
Hooters informed the EEOC early on in the agency's in-
vestigation that only women were hired for these
positions because the "primary function" of the Hooters
Girls was "providing vicarious sexual recreation." The
Girls' "uniforms are designed to tempt and titillate, con-
sisting of short shorts and either low cut tank tops or half
shirts, which are to be worn as form fitting as possible,
and the Girls are expected to enhance the titillation by
189. Nowhere else in the editorial does Bovard allude to either his methods of ob-
taining information or the level of his success in getting it.
190. Bovard, supra note 176.
191. Id.
192. Note, though, how this strategy differs from the technique used in the Hoot-
ers press release. There, the EEOC appeared to be a faceless, soulless, monolithic
entity that acted without regard to human consequences but had real effects on the
lives of people. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09. Here, by contrast, the
EEOC, as a law enforcement entity, is almost erased altogether in favor of its individ-
ual employees, whose personal agendas dominate the proceedings. This pair of
extremes-in which the EEOC is either bad because it is impersonal or bad because it
is too personal-is reminiscent of the classic contrasts between law and equity, or
between statutes and common law. We fear that the law without mollification or ad-
justment by human sympathy will be coldly destructive in its indifference to human
diversity and idiosyncracy, yet we fear that giving increased discretion to judges or
executive officers will result in radically unequal and unfair treatment of people be-
cause of those individuals' personal prejudices and agendas. We hate the tyranny of
the individual's whim, but we hate being governed by thousands of uniform rules too.
See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 140; Minow, Stripped Down, supra note 45.
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their interaction with customers. They are to flirt, cajole
and tease the patrons.
Sex Appeal
Hooters lawyer Patricia Casey wrote to the EEOC: "The
business of Hooters is predominantly the provision of
entertainment, diversion, and amusement based on the
sex appeal of the Hooters Girls." The Civil Rights Act of
1964 specifies that a company can discriminate among job
applicants based on Bona Fide Occupational Qualifi-
cations (BFOQ). The Playboy Club won repeated court
victories in the 1970s and 1980s when sued over its
female-only Bunny policy. But throughout the EEOC's
investigation of Hooters, the agency ignored the company's
hiring rationale.1
3
Here Bovard moves from (1) Hooters's description of itself
and its business, to (2) Casey's legal interpretation of that
business, (3) the BFOQ standard, (4) the parallel example of
the Playboy Club, and (5) the EEOC's alleged reaction. The
first three steps move in the opposite direction from that of a
legal argument, in which we would expect to begin with the
statute, then move into the facts and their legal meaning un-
der the statute. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the
BFOQ, the entire legal basis of the dispute, does not appear
until the fifth paragraph of the editorial, not only after Hoot-
ers's and Casey's arguments, but also after the innuendo
concerning Ricky Silberman and the more flagrant of the
EEOC's proposed remedies. Thus Bovard implies that the law
itself is less important than the relief sought, the conspiracy
behind the investigation, and the way Hooters operates. He
shows us a dispute which apparently is really about a battle
between individuals in the agency and Hooters's marketing
strategy, in which the law is merely a tool or weapon used in
that dispute. Further, by placing the BFOQ after two quota-
tions stating the "primary function" of the Hooters Girls and
the predominant business of Hooters, Bovard seems to show
the statutory defense growing out of those descriptions: having
been told what Hooters is and does, the reader is led to see the
193. Bovard, supra note 176, at A18. Owing to the industry-wide practice of news-
papers and magazines to add section headings that were not originally included by
the author, we can speculate that Bovard himself did not contemplate the boldface
words "Sex Appeal" where they actually appear in the article.
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statute as a label or explanation of those facts. By contrast,
had Bovard started with the BFOQ, the reader would then be
led to weigh whether the Hooters Girls fit its definition.
The reference to the Playboy Club poses an example of the
BFOQ that appears to support Hooters's case, rather than
mentioning the Wilson decision that would probably appear to
undermine it. In Bovard's world, the primary, perhaps the
classic, concrete example of a BFOQ is that of the Playboy
Bunny, a job that appears to be substantially identical to the
Hooters girl. Yet, as discussed earlier, the "repeated court vic-
tories" of the Playboy Club led to only two published decisions,
by tribunals having essentially no precedential authority, in
tandem with another decision that would seem to severely un-
dermine them."" To refer to these cases as if they were the last
word in BFOQ jurisprudence is less than honest.
To end these paragraphs with the assertion that the EEOC
"ignored" Hooters's rationale is a powerful device. Bovard has
sketched a transition from Hooters's rationale to the law and
its application. By shifting immediately to the EEOC's reac-
tion, and characterizing it in such an extreme way (surely the
EEOC performed more analysis than merely to "ignore" Hoot-
ers's argument for three years), Bovard implies that the EEOC
has ignored not only Hooters's hiring practices, but the statute
and precedents as well. He has so structured his description
that the law, the reader, and Bovard himself are all allied in
support of Hooters's position; abruptly, the EEOC, through ei-
ther malice or stupidity, is outside of that alliance.
In these paragraphs we also see Bovard's access to docu-
ments from the negotiation process itself. They contain exact
quotations from letters by Hooters and Casey to the EEOC;
they remind us both that Bovard has a lot of information be-
hind him and that we have access to none of it. They also give
prominence to Hooters's arguments in this dispute. By con-
trast, while devoting a lot of text to the remedies proposed by
the EEOC (which he believes to be absurd), Bovard says al-
most nothing about the legal or factual rationale for its
position. The EEOC's entire argument is summarized in one
sentence: "In September 1994, after sampling an unknown
number of happy hours and Buffalo wings, the EEOC decreed
that the business of Hooters was food, and that 'no physical
trait unique to women is required to serve food and drink to
194. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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customers in a restaurant.'"195 This characterization makes it
appear that the EEOC is acting peremptorily, without reason
or attention to facts that should be obvious. By giving detailed
reasons for one side but not the other, Bovard gives the im-
pression that only one side has reasons.
In the remaining eight paragraphs of this narrative, Bovard
focuses all his attention on the various conciliation offers and
Hooters's and Bovard's own responses to them. He describes,
in what I must call fascinated detail, different elements of the
remedies proposed by the EEOC and how specific amounts are
to be calculated and allocated. The remedies and procedures
he describes occur in this order: (1) assembling a list of men
alleged to have been victims of discrimination; (2) setting up a
settlement fund for those victims; (3) the method of calculating
the amount of award for each victim; (4) advertisements by
Hooters to inform alleged victims of the availability of claims;
(5) the EEOC's method of verifying claims; (6) altering the bal-
ance of males and females in Hooters's workforce; (7)
establishment of a fund to enhance skills, opportunities, and
education of males; and (8) Hooters's objections to the settle-
ment fund and the EEOC's response with specific numbers.'
Bovard has essentially nothing good to say about the
EEOC's position, methods, or attitude related to any of the
remedies. His central substantive argument, either made
expressly or implied in the syntax used to describe the EEOC's
positions, is that the EEOC has based nearly all of its
remedies on unwarranted or false factual assumptions. Differ-
ent versions of this substantive argument appear repeatedly
throughout the narrative. For example, he quotes Patricia
Casey as saying:
"They just wanted to see every single application that had
a man's name on it--even though many of the applica-
tions could have been for kitchen jobs, such as cook or
dishwasher. If the guy wrote at the top that he would ac-
cept any position, or wrote nothing in that space, then the
195. Bovard, supra note 176, at A18.
196. See id. I have phrased the preceding list in what I hope is a dispassionate
and "sanitized" tone, giving essentially no details and leaving out all of the commen-
tary that pervades Bovard's work. But is my tone really dispassionate? In trying to
avoid adopting Bovard's highly opinionated syntax, have I gone so far in the other
direction as to take the EEOC's side?
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EEOC officials" ludicrously concluded he was applying for
a females-only position. 97
Elsewhere, Bovard says that the EEOC "effectively assumed
that after a guy applied for a job at Hooters he applied no-
where else and sat by the phone for over half a year, waiting
for a Hooters call."'9 In describing the suggestion that Hooters
advertise to alert men who unsuccessfully attempted to apply
for jobs to the availability of damages, Bovard says:
Since most restaurants do not keep job applications for
longer than one year, the EEOC-mandated campaign will
provide a windfall for perjurers. It would be cheaper and
more honest simply to require that Hooters restaurants
open their cash registers and invite men off the street to
come in and grab a handful of bills.' 99
Bovard says that the EEOC's method of verifying the
authenticity of claims will be "[pirimarily by checking the
postmark, to make sure that it was mailed before the deadline
for the claims."2" In describing the method used to calculate
the size of the proposed claims fund, Bovard says that the
EEOC "laboriously concocted an 'average male shortfall' for
each Hooters restaurant-based on the convenient assumption
that half of the hires should have been male."2 °'
The argument underlying these express and implied com-
ments-that the EEOC's factual assumptions are not supported
by known facts-is the sort of valid criticism that can and ought
to be made. Yet we would normally expect to see such an argu-
ment couched in terms of the refuting evidence. For example,
in the passage referencing Casey's comments above, Bovard
could have said something like this: "The anecdotal evidence
suggests that many applications by men which do not specify a
position are for non-server positions; in fact, as many as 40%
of men apply for 'back-of-the-house' jobs."20 2 Where he criticizes
the assumptions concerning how long an applicant would have
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Since I do not, myself, have access to any such data, I have made these num-
bers up. This sentence, as well as the two other examples following it, are designed to
show a style and method of argument, not any factual information.
SPRING 1998]
622 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
remained unemployed, he might say, "In fact, the average man
who applies for a restaurant position applies for several such
positions, and is typically able to find employment after a few
weeks of searching." Where he disbelieves the assumption that
half of Hooters's employees would or should be male, he could
suggest that "a more reasonable assumption, given what we
know of male and female employment rates in the restaurant
industry, would be that a lower percentage of the Hooters
workforce would be male." Even if Bovard lacked access to any
of the hard data on these points, he could still make conjec-
tures as to what a rigorous study of the information would
show. He might, for example, say, "Although I do not actually
know the number of restaurant jobs for which the average out-
of-work man applies, I'll bet that an actual study would reveal
that such men apply for an average of four or five jobs." He
could then criticize the EEOC for any failure to conduct such
an actual study. I infer that Bovard believes that the evidence,
if gathered, would support something like the propositions I
have outlined. Yet, remarkably, his express and implied criti-
cisms of the EEOC's assumptions contain no refuting facts at
all, nor any conjectures as to what those facts probably are.
What are we to make of this?
The editorial omits the facts refuting the EEOC's assump-
tions because the existence or nonexistence of those facts is
unimportant to the rhetorical community being created by this
text. If we were supposed to care about the evidence, then the
evidence would be supplied. But this editorial isn't really
about proof or disproof, any more than it is really about inter-
preting the law. It is about a fundamental division imagined to
exist between two discordant segments of society: the femi-
nists, bureaucrats, and academics on the one hand, and the
common people, Hooters, Casey, and Bovard on the other. All of
the descriptions of the EEOC's suggested remedies define the
agency as being without the habits of mind that ordinary, sen-
sible people have-the agency, and all those who support it,
are outside of the "normal" community.
The concluding paragraphs of the editorial contain clear ex-
pressions of Bovard's opinion. As I have indicated, one of his
last paragraphs compares the EEOC to temperance sisters
smashing up a bar. Finally he says:
Civil rights crusades have gone from allowing blacks to
sit at lunch counters to allowing government employees
to dictate the cup size of the person who serves lunch.
[VOL. 31:3
Discourse About Sex Discrimination
The EEOC's attack on Hooters is a direct attack on the
First Amendment's Freedom of Association. Hooters,
which has been characterized as a "Playboy Club for
Rednecks," does no harm and the Hooters Girls receive
much larger tips than waitresses at many other restau-
rants. Yet, because a handful of EEOC officials believe it
is reprehensible for a restaurant to use titillation to sell
beer and greasy food, the weight of the federal govern-
ment is falling on Hooters' head.2 3
This last paragraph has a complex system of meaning, and
works on several levels at the same time. The comparison be-
tween the civil rights battles of four decades past and
contemporary discrimination disputes is common; generally, as
here, the writer is trying to suggest that contemporary civil
rights efforts are less noble and less sensible than older
ones.2' The word "crusades," in this context, ironically sug-
gests how the mighty have fallen: once we were crusaders, now
we're measuring brassieres. But look at the particular com-
parison being drawn: allowing blacks to sit at a lunch counter
vs. controlling the "cup size" of the person who serves the
lunch. A moment's reflection will reveal that both were con-
tained in the original version of the Civil Rights Act; that is,
discriminating based on sex in the hiring of servers was for-
bidden from the start. Indeed, the protection for employees
was broader than for patrons, since Title VII forbids sex dis-
crimination while Title II does not."0 Further, one might argue
that protecting employees is more important than protecting
patrons, since the former protects people's livelihoods while
the latter protects only their convenience. Also, the core of the
criticism contained in these two sentences-that government
officials should not dictate who can work in a restaurant, and
that the policy infringes on the freedom of association-are
precisely the criticisms that could be, and indeed have been,
made of Title VII and Title II themselves.2" Yet Bovard's
phrasing suggests that he is criticizing some new development
203. Bovard, supra note 176, at A18.
204. Many people, for example, have angrily denounced any comparison between
efforts to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation and efforts to eliminate
discrimination based on race. See, e.g., Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisex-
ual Rights and 'The Civil Rights Agenda", 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POLY REP. 33 (1994).
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
206. See Nancy E. Dowd, Liberty v& Equality: In Defense of Privileged White
Males, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FOR-
BIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)).
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not contemplated by the original statute, because his grammar
implies that evolution has taken place.
The last two sentences of the paragraph take Bovard in a
slightly different direction. From an argument decrying our
fallen values and pointing out a possible constitutional argu-
ment, he now turns to what appears to be a practical or moral
argument. First we are told that Hooters does no harm and
has some benefit for the workers; 2 7 then we are told that all of
the trouble is caused by the agendas of a few isolated officials.
These two points both have resonant and powerful roots. To
say that someone "does no harm" touches our belief that the
law should control that which is harmful, not that which is
simply distasteful or unpleasant. The sentence also contains a
deprecating reference to Hooters-a "Playboy Club for Red-
necks" is surely a small, unimportant thing that should be
beneath the law's notice. The wording of the law, and its inter-
pretation by the courts, vanishes altogether; what's important
is that this is a small and harmless thing.
The last sentence refers to the important argument, alluded
to earlier in the editorial and discussed in this Article, that the
real issue is whether the selling of sexuality is legitimate in a
culture that has tried to outlaw sex discrimination in employ-
ment. Bovard suggests, here and elsewhere, that the EEOC is
masking the real motivation behind its investigation because
an honest reading of Title VII does not show any overt prohibi-
tion on such businesses, and, indeed, the existence of the
BFOQ defense suggests that such businesses may be expressly
permitted by the statute. It is an odd way, though, to end an
editorial whose main text has concerned the EEOC's remedies
and calculation methods. Bovard could have written a very
convincing editorial about the dangers of hiding the real issue,
about the need to have an explicit debate about the underlying
problem, and predicting the result of such a rigorous debate.
But this is not his argument, nor is it the intent of this sen-
tence. This sentence, like most of the editorial, is designed to
show the alarming behavior of a small group of isolated bu-
reaucrats intent on furthering their own fanatical beliefs.
Indeed, the whole paragraph serves that purpose: The first
two sentences show how unworthy current EEOC officials are
207. The size of the tip, however, is not the only criterion in determining whether
workers benefit from a certain kind of employment. At least one commentator has
suggested that the price paid for this particular kind of exploitation is worth more
than the increased tips. See Ciriello, supra note 78.
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to fill the shoes of their forbears; the third shows that they are
so unrealistic and obsessed as to pick on a harmless insect; the
last shows that they will stop at nothing to get their way.
Although this editorial is entitled "The EEOC's War on
Hooters," its true subject is a war that odd, radical lawyers are
supposedly waging on all of us. The true battleground here is
the question, "What is the mainstream, and who is in it?" This
rhetoric defines EEOC lawyers as being out of the main-
stream, and defines Bovard and Hooters within it. Bovard
asks the reader to join him in this mainstream community,
and to reject and ostracize those outside it. As in other texts
we have seen, the basis for joining his community is not facts
or law, but common sense, a quality imagined to exist in all
people and independent of education or reflection. We are
asked to join Bovard because the over-educated have taken
control of the government and are about to do horrible things
to all of us. We are not expected to form our own opinions, and
are not given the information with which to do it; what is im-
portant is whose side we are on. This is war, after all.
B. The Radio Commentary by Laura Archer Pulfer
So effective was the advertising campaign launched by
Hooters that of the dozens of editorials published immediately
after the press release, only a few supported the EEOC's posi-
tion.2"8 I have selected a short radio commentary by Laura
Archer Pulfer both because it was broadcast nationally and
because it involves some rhetoric that is substantially differ-
ent from that appearing in the other pieces I have discussed.
208. You will observe an assumption underlying this sentence. By stating that the
dearth of editorials supporting the EEOC was due to the success of Hooters's adver-
tising campaign, I am assuming that the EEOC's position was strong enough to have
merited more support without that campaign. A reader who supports Hooters could
reply that the reason behind the strong editorial support for Hooters is simply that
Hooters was obviously in the right. Hooters may have been in the right, but given the
disparity in resources devoted to convincing the public (Hooters spent a great deal of
money on it, while EEOC spent essentially nothing), it is impossible to attribute the
lopsided editorial support simply to the strength of the arguments. Of course, editorial
writers might have been just as outraged had the EEOC also spent a million dollars
on advertising, but my instincts tell me otherwise. Naturally, my instincts are per-
sonal; yours may tell you differently. To a certain extent, this sort of supposition can
be verified or refuted using those aspects of the scientific method that are open to
social scientists.
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The two major news programs on National Public Radio
(NPR), Morning Edition and All Things Considered, have a
practice of inviting short commentaries on current events by
people who do not normally appear on such broadcasts. These
commentaries usually do not present the party line of one of
the familiar sides of an existing conflict, but add some new
twist not previously seen in the straight news reporting.
Pulfer, a columnist for the Cincinnati Inquirer, read her
Hooters commentary on Morning Edition on November 29,
1995, twelve days after Bovard's editorial was published."9 Her
commentary is considerably shorter than Bovard's, only about
350 words to his 1,000. This is partially due to the medium in
which she is working-radio commentary necessarily must be
shorter than newspaper editorials covering the same ground.
Here is the opening of Pulfer's commentary:
OK, so now the government is back to work. There's a lot
to do and nobody really wants them to use a bunch of
their valuable time on a certain restaurant chain. After
all, the whole concept is all in fun. First, and I know this
is petty of me, but I'm not going to use the official name.
Here's a hint-the company logo is an owl with very large
eyes. They're already getting millions of dollars of free
publicity because four Chicago men have filed suit against
them. Let's just call this place Redneck Slang for Women's
Breasts.210
The most striking thing about this paragraph, and indeed,
the whole commentary, is its tongue-in-cheek informality. In
Bovard's editorial, informality was used as a specific device in
specific places, while elsewhere the syntax was technical and
sophisticated. Here, the entire piece is written in a conversa-
tional, irreverent, and amused voice. The effect of the
informality, as in Bovard's case, is to invoke the common peo-
ple, but Pulfer's constant use of it is more successful in
achieving that end. Further, that voice emphasizes what is
made clear at the outset: that this is Pulfer's opinion, pure and
simple, and that she doesn't take her own opinion very seri-
ously. We are not going to be treated to any revelations of new
facts, nor is Pulfer claiming to have access to more or better
209. Laura Archer Pulfer, Morning Edition: Hooters Patrons Must Not Care Much
About Food or Women (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 29, 1995).
210. Id.
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information than we do, nor will there be a logical argument
about the law or the facts. On what basis, then, are we invited
to be convinced?
The first sentence is a reference to the notorious shutdown,
in November and December 1995, of most of the federal
government, occasioned by the temporary inability of the
Congress and the President to agree on a budget. Other
commentators on the Hooters controversy alluded to the
government shutdown, using the dispute to suggest ironically
that the government should never have been allowed to
reopen.21 ' In this commentary, however, Pulfer begins with the
assertion that we do want the government to reopen, that its
work is important, and that, in fact, we are all in general
agreement that Hooters is not a worthy topic for its attention.
This stance is interesting because it is evident, from the tone
of Pulfer's writing and the rest of what she says, that she
thinks Hooters is in the wrong. When she says, "the whole
concept is all in fun," she leaves the referent unclear: is she
referring to Hooters's marketing strategy, the government
shutdown, the idea that the government's time is valuable, or
what?
She goes on to focus on something which she calls, and ini-
tially appears to be, petty: whether to mention Hooters's name.
She gives us a "hint," suggesting that this is some sort of
game-and it really is a game, since it is obvious that anyone
who will understand anything about her commentary will
know whom she is talking about from the very start. Then she
suggests that the restaurant is receiving free publicity from
the Latuga case, and she does not want to provide any more by
naming it. Suddenly the significance of the controversy is re-
versed-the EEOC investigation is not a threat to Hooters's
life; it is the biggest boon the chain could have received. The
dozens of editorials written about Hooters, we now realize,
must have piqued the curiosity of thousands who would never
have set foot in the place otherwise.212 The thought abruptly
crosses our minds that the entire controversy could be a pub-
licity stunt.
In this amused, ironic, mocking, and self-mocking observa-
tion, Pulfer shows us who she is and why we should believe in
211. See, e.g., Jim Haynes, Hooters Exposes Other Wrongs to Redress, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 1995, at H3; Hooting for the Shutdown, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1995, at A26; Who Gives a Hoot?, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov.
18, 1995, at 14A.
212. Including me. See supra notes 55-56.
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her. Her ethos is based on the fact that she sees things differ-
ently from other people-not because she's any smarter or
better informed, but precisely because she is quirky. By look-
ing at things through a funhouse mirror, she is able to put
together facts in new combinations that most people do not
bother to see. Consequently, she is able to think creatively and
arrive at new truths. Such a claim is strong in our culture: it is
the claim of the shaman, the mystic, and the poet. Such a voice
is devoted to truth, but truth unsullied by formal logic, polite-
ness, or conventionality. When she calls the place "Redneck
Slang for Women's Breasts," she is being rude and insulting-
because she is speaking what she believes to be the truth
without caring what anyone thinks.
Pulfer deliberately limits her audience. By refusing to name
Hooters, she necessarily is talking only to those who already
know the facts of the dispute and the basic arguments on both
sides. She is refusing to tell us these things, and giving us her
own odd perspective instead. As a result, we understand that
this is a conversation for people who have already done their
homework and are ready to hear a new and possibly bizarre
outlook. In academic terms, this is not an undergraduate sur-
vey course on the Hooters controversy, but a graduate seminar.
Obviously, this elevates the status of the listener, who is as-
sumed to be an active, and hopefully skeptical, participant in
this process.
The second paragraph focusses on Hooters's advertising
campaign:
The EEOC says the policy of hiring only women amounts
to sex discrimination. Now, here's what the company's
doing. They're handing out thousands of postcards with a
guy with a mustache wearing skimpy shorts and a tank
top, asking "What's wrong with this picture?" I wonder
why they picked this big, hairy man. Was RuPaul on an-
other gig? We're supposed to send these to our Congress-
person asking Washington to "get a grip." I think I'll send
the card they gave me to Patricia Shroeder. She seems
very alert. I'm sure she'll be able to figure out what is
wrong with this picture.213
Here, maintaining her strongly ironic and humorous tone,
Pulfer's focus is entirely on the Hooters advertising campaign;
213. Pulfer, supra note 209.
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again it is the publicity, rather than the substance of the
dispute itself, that interests her. She observes the EEOC's
position without commenting for or against it-and rightly
so, because in this text the outcome of the dispute is not
important or relevant. She then makes the same observation
that I made earlier, namely that the type of model chosen for the
advertising photograph bears some examination.21 ' By naming
RuPaul, Pulfer reminds us of the broad variety of models for
gender-bending roles and situations, implying that we should
question why this particular picture should have been chosen-
although, again, only those who already know who RuPaul is
will get the joke.215 Similarly, Pulfer ridicules the instruction to
lobby Congress by suggesting that Representative Patricia
Shroeder-a prominent feminist legislator who has repeatedly
challenged unequal treatment of the sexes-would be an ideal
person to read the advertisement.
Throughout this paragraph, Pulfer suggests arguments
without making them, and, indeed, causes us to wonder ex-
actly what argument she's making. Hooters might have picked
RuPaul instead of the model they did pick-and therefore
what? Patricia Shroeder will be able to discern what is wrong
with the picture-and what will she conclude? What, exactly is
wrong with the picture anyway, and from what point of view?
In each case, Pulfer changes the perspective on the issue with-
out following through with a conclusion; she leaves it to the
listener to draw conclusions from the twist she has applied.
Were a first-year law student to talk this way, the professor
might worry that the student was unable to take an argument
through all of its necessary steps. But law professors them-
selves do talk this way in class, precisely when they are trying
to inspire students to make logical connections. The students
call it "hiding the ball" and find it enormously frustrating, but
practitioners of the so-called "Socratic method" believe that it
214. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24. I made my observations and
reached my conclusions concerning the photograph before reading Pulfer's commen-
tary. (But why do I find it necessary to tell you this? Does it increase the veracity of
my own observations that I made them independently? Or, to the contrary, does the
fact that Pulfer and I agree with one another actually discredit any praise I give her
rhetoric?)
215. RuPaul is the professional name of RuPaul Andre Charles, a prominent
singer, film actor and television/radio personality, whose trademark is his superb
ability as a "drag queen." See RUPAuL, LETTiN IT ALL HANG OUT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1995). I admit that, although I suspected what she meant, I did not get the joke at
first; I had to look it up.
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gives students the ability to think creatively on their feet.21
This is a deeply dialectical approach. Not only does Pulfer
permit us to think for ourselves, she insists on it, while at the
same time pointing out the discontinuities that should inspire
our ruminations.
The next paragraph moves in an utterly different direction:
Hamilton Jordan has been retained to make sure they get
a fair shake. That sounds about right. Mr. Jordan has had
some practice in dealing with delicate matters of, shall we
say, a mammary nature. He was Jimmy Carter's chief of
staff in 1978 when he denied a Washington Post report
that he spit amaretto down the front of a woman's blouse.
The year before that, Mr. Jordan denied a report that he
peeked down the blouse of the wife of the Egyptian am-
bassador.217
What is this passage doing here? It appears to be an ad
hominem attack on Hooters's particular choice of associates,218
and a very strange sort of attack at that. Hamilton Jordan,
who Pulfer says has been "retained" by Hooters, is known for
many things, including his successful battle with cancer, his
unsuccessful campaign for the United States Senate, his
chairmanship of the Association of Tennis Professionals, and
his work for third-party presidential candidate Ross Perot.19 It
seems odd to focus on two disputed accusations occurring at
least seventeen years in the past; even if these accusations
against Jordan were justified, what possible connection do
they have to the case at hand? By noting not that they hap-
pened, but merely that Jordan denied them, Pulfer lets us
know just how uncertain all of this is. What function does this
conspicuous non sequitur serve, other than as a sort of "cheap
shot"?
The only link seems to be a metaphorical one: the centrality
of female breasts as an object of staring or other activities in
216. I have, however, sharply criticized the Socratic method elsewhere. See Ken-
neth L. Schneyer, Bully Pulpit: Effective Teachers Face Their Power over Students
Honestly, L. TCHR., Spring 1996, at 1; see also Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its
Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1577 (1990).
217. Pulfer, supra note 209.
218. I have not, as yet, been able to find news articles indicating that Hooters has
retained Mr. Jordan in any capacity.
219. See Iris Cohen Selinger, Hamilton Jordan: Ex-Carter Aide Plunges into Book
Marketing at Whittle, ADWEEK, Mar. 18. 1991 (Eastern ed.), § 1 at 12; see also Carter
Aide Jordan to Run for Senate, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1985, at 22.
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American culture generally. Just as the restaurant is named
for a "Slang for Women's Breasts," just as looking at breasts
appears to be the primary entertainment provided by Hooters,
so was this prominent, important man apparently engaged in
rude and offensive actions involving women's breasts. The
topic is not sex discrimination against men, nor sexual harass-
ment per se, but a cultural obsession with the female anatomy.
That is the issue, and that is what we should be talking about.
What bothers Pulfer, as implied by the earlier paragraphs, is
that the Latuga case, the EEOC investigation, and the ad
campaign only serve to pique the public's curiosity about
Hooters and perpetuate this very cultural obsession. By
constructing her voice in the way she has done, Pulfer tells us
not that these things are true, but that we should seriously
consider thinking the way she does and wondering whether
they are true.
Her final paragraph attacks the discrimination question
directly-or almost directly:
The official company line is that if they have to hire men,
it will put them out of business. That sounds just like
what women were being told 30 years ago when they
wanted to be stockbrokers and lawyers and bankers.
These places have a purpose. They're places for people to
eat who don't care much about food and who really don't
care very much about women, except, of course, for their
breasts. As for the rest of us, if we don't stay away in
droves, then the joke's on us.220
Again, Pulfer changes the perspective of the argument.
Hooters's BFOQ argument is not the same as arguments
made against bringing women into lucrative and powerful
professions-except that it is. The old bankers and lawyers
were not talking about the employee's ability to do the job-or
were they? Hooters is not trying to maintain gender-specific
hiring because of outdated prejudices in the profession or its
clientele-or is it? Could it be that all of these arguments are
about the same thing-the oppression and exploitation of
women? Pulfer steps back from the technicalities of the
question and focuses, again, on the broad cultural implica-
tions, not by making the connections directly nor putting
220. Pulfer, supra note 209.
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together a logical argument, but by forcing us to frame and
defend a denial of her beliefs.
By talking about the "purpose" of Hooters, Pulfer would
seem to be admitting the strength of the BFOQ argument:
Hooters has a purpose, and that purpose is sexual-that is,
breasts. But to Pulfer this does not work in Hooters's favor;
instead, it raises the broader cultural question of what a
BFOQ should be, and what it really means when we say that
sex is really a job qualification. Does this mean she's chal-
lenging the statute, our interpretations of it, or something
else? Again, to Pulfer, this doesn't matter-however we frame
the argument, a business based on breasts is a bad idea. Her
advice is that we refuse to patronize it, lest we be duped by the
very publicity associated with the dispute-indeed, she implies
that we betray our own abilities if we fail to stay away.
In the world created by this text, Pulfer is an idiosyncratic
teacher who teaches by suggesting difficult contradictions and
weird perspectives, and asks her students to reason their way
out of them. The reader is seen as knowledgeable, intelligent,
and responsible for making both policy analysis and real-world
decisions. Hooters is seen as conniving and manipulative,
while the EEOC seems thick and possibly irrelevant.
The problem with this highly dynamic, indirect rhetoric is
that it makes it too easy to simply write Hooters's genuine
concerns right out of the argument. Isn't there something real
involved in this dispute? And if the EEOC's position were en-
forced, isn't there some evidence suggesting that Hooters's
business would be damaged? Is she saying that this business
deserves to be damaged, and that the same is true of all simi-
lar businesses? Because of her style of argument, Pulfer does
not have to address these questions directly, if at all. Because
she refuses to deal in technicalities, she leaves the most diffi-
cult legal questions unanswered and possibly unanswerable.
This method of talking is a fine way to begin a conversation,
but it seems a poor way to end one.
VIII. SOME CONCLUSIONS
With such wildly contrasting universes created by the rheto-
ric of these texts, I am left wondering whether those universes
and their implications are inevitably dictated by the parties'
substantive positions, or whether they could have adopted
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each others' positions while retaining their constitutive rheto-
ric. Clearly I approve of the rhetoric used by the EEOC and
disapprove of the rhetoric used by Hooters's press release; I go
so far as to call them "honest" and "dishonest," respectively. I
find that the EEOC's rhetoric invites the growth and critical
capacities of its readers, while the Hooters rhetoric, both in its
press kit and its advertisement, seems to invite naught but
unquestioning belief-and this while pretending to fight for
the little guy against a giant. As I suggested before, I have
been inclined to think that "good rhetoric" can appear even in
a "bad" substantive text, and vice versa. These documents do
not modify that view; indeed, the EEOC gives very little indi-
cation of its substantive position at all, and it is very easy to
imagine that Hooters could, with its substantive views, adopt
a very different rhetorical stance.
The Casey and Becker essays raise another, but equally dis-
turbing reflection: gender is either everything, or it is nothing.
In Becker's language, the concept of sexual difference, the use
of sexuality to degrade, and the societal oppression of women
loom so large that the plaintiff and the defendant and all of
their mundane concerns seem to evaporate. In Casey's lan-
guage, gender oppression and the concept of exploitation never
arise at all. Casey, too, ignores the male plaintiffs, but the only
mention of any sort of actual problems created by gender are
in her ironic reference to Lillie Rubin. What she cares about is
freedom and good decision making and, above all, winning.
The Bovard editorial and the Pulfer commentary present
two radically different forms of rhetoric. Bovard reports facts,
while Pulfer assumes that facts are known; Bovard provides
no opportunity for the reader to form her own opinion, while
Pulfer insists that the reader form an opinion with little or no
help from Pulfer; Bovard is in a war against the intellectual
elite, while Pulfer seems to be critiquing our culture as a
whole. The two pieces do share a common rhetorical thread,
though: neither of them bears a close resemblance to legal
rhetoric or legal writing. The law is not important, nor even a
rigorous analysis of the facts; these two writers seem much
freer to ride the tides of emotion, outrage, quirkiness, or hu-
mor than, for example, either Casey or Becker. Yet something
is lost, here-neither Bovard nor Pulfer ever reaches the core
difficulties of the substantive issues, nor the hard questions of
precedent or statutory interpretation. Their words can be very
satisfying, but in another sense, empty.
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While the texts I have gathered in this article vary consid-
erably in their form, tone, and content, they share some
commonalities that shed light on the kind of dialogue being
created by the chorus of voices speaking about the Hooters
controversies. Of the seven different texts sampled, four sup-
port Hooters's position, while three support the EEOC's. The
four texts supporting Hooters share a strong, common thread:
a perceived gap between EEOC officials, academics, and femi-
nists on the one hand, and ordinary people and Hooters on the
other. In all four of those texts, the notion that Hooters's hiring
practices violate Title VII is imagined to be something of
which only a mind divorced from everyday reality could con-
ceive. Those who can conceive of it are defined to be outside
the realm of normal people that always includes both the
writer and the reader. The texts assume that common sense,
routine experience, and an understanding of the way business
and sexuality operate would naturally form an opinion that
would place Hooters's marketing strategy and hiring practices
outside the realm of what can reasonably be regulated. Anyone
who believes otherwise is, well, crazy.
But remember that the Hooters controversies are the sur-
face of a deeper, more troubling issue: the extent to which
sexuality is an appropriate commodity for trade. Numerous
commentators have criticized the commodification of women's
bodies, suggesting both that it fosters the continuation of a
cultural practice of treating women as objects or instruments
to be used for the benefit of men, and that it has the practical
effect of encouraging increased sexual abuse or violence."
Some of these have named Hooters itself as an important con-
tributor to a culture of sexual violence.222 Among the writers I
have discussed, only Becker and Pulfer come close to attacking
this cultural issue at all, and in each case one wants to hear
more of it. Most of the other writers seem to assume, indeed,
that the cultural question is not really a valid one. Elements of
the Hooters press kit, as well as some of Hooters's other public
statements, speak repeatedly of "wholesome, all-American sex-
appeal" as if to be worried about the objectification and domi-
nation of women is un-American.
221. See Ciriello, supra note 78, at 273-74; Rhee, supra note 4, at 180-85. For a
feminist analysis that resists the logic of the anti-commodification approach and in-
stead analyzes the "degradation prohibition," see DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY
DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1995).
222. See Ciriello, supra note 78, at 273-74.
223. See PRESS KIT, supra note 68.
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When stepping back and looking not only at the rhetoric of
these texts, but also at the rhetoric of this Article, one is
moved to ask the extent to which my own prejudices have in-
fluenced my view of the rhetoric. I presented those prejudices
early on, in order to attempt to prevent such pollution. Yet it is
clear that I have tended to see value in the rhetoric of those
who oppose Hooters in one way or another, while seeing dis-
honesty and manipulation in those who support it. Of course
this is not uniformly true, and I have found both praiseworthy
and troubling rhetoric in almost every piece I have examined.
Yet still, since I am praising those whose substantive views I
endorse, you may wonder whether I would have said the same
things if identical rhetoric had been used to make contrary ar-
guments. I don't know. I hope so. It seems to me that someone
like Pulfer might have easily engaged in the same sort of "bad"
rhetoric I see in the Hooters advertisement; I am even more
strongly convinced that a pro-Hooters case could be made with
what I would call good rhetoric.
Of course, the term "prejudice" here is broader than strong
views on mere substantive issues. I am a lawyer, and an aca-
demic lawyer at that; I have a certain training and a certain
background, and I have come to appreciate certain kinds of
language-specifically that which raises an awareness of com-
plexity. Someone like me tends to deplore language that erases
complexity and causes us to think that all things are straight-
forward; for example, there is very little advertising of which I
approve. These prejudices are systemic, and are present not
only throughout this Article, but also in all of my published
writing. Perhaps they are simply my views of what rhetoric
should be.
These prejudices lead me in a certain direction when I con-
sider what a "better" debate about this issue might look like.
As a partisan of complexity and someone who is convinced that
both law and talk about law are aspirational expressions that
attempt to express the ideal community, I would want the de-
baters to put the difficulties of the BFOQ defense squarely
before them, inquiring into why Title VII bans discrimination
based on sex in the first place (many know that it's wrong, but
would be hard-pressed to articulate their reasons). On each side,
there would need to be an acknowledgment of the strengths of
the other's position: Hooters would concede both that sexual en-
tertainment is not completely consistent with equal opportunity
for the sexes and that there are some troubling parallels with
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Wilson, while its opponents would concede Hooters's genuine
business interests and the probability that Title VII's drafters
did not intend to eradicate sexual entertainment.
Eventually, inevitably, each writer would argue over the
frankly difficult question of sexual entertainment in a society
that has adopted an intolerance for sex discrimination. For
Hooters, I think that this probably means arguing that Wilson
was wrongly decided, as well as stating, once and for all,
whether it views itself as a family restaurant or a place of
sexual titillation, and, if both, why the two are not inconsis-
tent. Its opponents, on the other hand, probably must argue
that it is necessary to go beyond Congress's intention in
adopting Title VII, while clearly saying how much, if any,
commercial leeway should be given for sexual self-expression.
Vital to both sides is an overt expression of which people or
ideas are entitled to authority, which interests and opinions
are entitled to respect, and why. In my most ideal debate, there
would be an underlying assumption---or at least a clearly
stated hope-that both sides are part of the same community
and consequently share the goal of arriving at a just solution
to a complex problem.
When we argue about an issue so vexed as the proper place
of gender and sexuality within the commerce and politics of a
society, we inevitably face both deeply entrenched beliefs and
nearly intractable subtleties. To acknowledge complexity and
encourage critical, independent analysis seems essential if we
are to escape the platitudes, fanaticism, and unconsidered
opinions and practices that gave rise to the dispute in the first
place. We rely on easy metaphors and common sense to our
peril.
[VOL. 31:3
